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FOUR DIMENSIONS OF POWER
I. INTRODUCTION
Because of the way that we divide up the world, it seems as
though ownership and control are inextricably linked. Thus, we
find it hard even to think about ways in which more humane,
democratic, and participatory workplaces could be organized.
The boss is the boss.
Traditionally, the idea of control has been aligned with hierarchy or
"ownership," while participation has been linked with democracy and
"humanization." Recently, though, these structural understandings have
been challenged by the changing patterns of work and workplace
organization. This paper argues that the course of power in the workplace
setting is more complex and multidimensional than a flat
hierarchy/coercion, horizontality/agency alignment and explores different
patterns of work and production, and the possibilities for worker
organization and employee voice in various settings. Its primary goal is not
simply to defend certain forms of work-related organizations, but rather to
show the problems in our concepts of power relations and to expose the
logic of control in the context of the laws of work.
In the first part of the paper (Section II), I map the arguments and
reasoning regarding collective bargaining and employee participation from
two perspectives--"efficiency," including productivity, profitability,
macro-efficiency and growth, and "legitimacy," including intrinsic values
of membership, self-fulfillment, equitable power distribution, and the work
arena as a learning process for the broader structures of society. As I
unpack the genres of scholarship dealing with these questions, I emphasize
two findings. First, I show how both economists and critical social
theorists are divided in their accounts regarding the desirability of either of
the two institutions--collective bargaining and employee participation.
Thus, contrary to common assumptions about clear "pro-labor"r'pro-
capital" divisions concerning unionization and participation, I find that
there are no sharp alignments among scholars. Second, I describe how,
despite the fact that there are very similar patterns of argumentation
regarding each of the two modes of worker organization, collective
bargaining and employee participation are depicted as sharply distinct and
often mutually exclusive institutions. The two modes are often relegated to
different industries, times, economies, and perhaps most strikingly, "types"
of workers: I argue that both the internal disagreements among labor
scholars with regard to the desirability of each of these institutions and the
belief that the two institutions are sharply distinct can be understood as a
1. James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible? The Postmodern Subject in Legal Theory, 62
U. COLO. L. REv. 489,491 (1991) (footnote omitted).
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result of the different realities and perceptions of coercion, agency and
power in the context of work.
In section III, I describe the linear story of the movement from the
"old" model of work, characterized by the realities of assembly-line
production (Fordism) and by the theory of scientific management
(Taylorism), to the "new" model of work, which is based on flexible, lean
production, "relational coordination," "flat hierarchies," and the theory of
managerialism. Within this context, I describe the shift from collective
bargaining, as has been constructed by the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA," "the Act," "the Wagner Act"), to new models of employee
participation, such as "self-managed teams," "quality circles" and
"employee-action committees."
In sections IV and V, I introduce four dimensions of coercion that can
be present in a workplace setting: "vertical," "horizontal," "internal" and
"co-optive." Within each category, I demonstrate a symmetry between
mechanisms of control applied by management and modes of resistance
that emerge among workers; the latter once again raising problems of
coercion and agency. I further demonstrate how legislators and courts have
traditionally constructed the prohibition of coercive mechanisms through a
narrow vertical understanding of work-related power relations. I also argue
that a more comprehensive conception of such relations, vertical,
horizontal and internal, requires us to rethink the language and
interpretation of central labor and employment laws.
The first dimension, hierarchical or vertical coercion, represents our
paradigmatic understanding of coercion in the traditional setting of
hierarchical relationships between management and labor (for example,
Taylorist-Fordist Regimes). Collective bargaining, as we perceive it
through the "old" NLRA model, has been a direct response to this type of
relationship. It is built on the notion of hierarchical organization:
countering adversarial power with power. As a result of the united-front
and loyalty requirements of hierarchical representation, unions have
historically excluded, discriminated against or inadequately represented the
interests of women, minorities and immigrants.
The second dimension, which I describe as horizontal coercion, is
increasingly central to new patterns of flexible "flat hierarchies" of
employment. I show that despite the fact that participatory schemes, such
as "self-managed teams," are depicted as empowering forms of employee
voice, they are often used as mechanisms for peer pressure, monitoring and
control of information. More broadly, participatory settings pose new
requirements that can become equally coercive, emphasizing open-ended
"soft-skills," interpersonal skills, "emotional labor" and "forced intimacy."
Moreover, in participatory settings, work organization and worker
organization are often conflated, and it becomes difficult to distinguish
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between modes of employee resistance and managerial control
mechanisms. At the same time, quasi-independent employee organizations
("caucuses") are developed, which move away from formal unions and
mirror the structures of participatory programs. Here again, certain groups
of workers may be disparately impacted, and new "counter-powers," such
as "employee diversity committees" and "identity caucuses," emerge to
overcome these disparities.
The third category, internal coercion, refers to various mechanisms
that are relatively invisible, and therefore harder to resist, in the workplace.
A paradigmatic example is the corporate culture movement. This
movement indoctrinates, in subtle and in less subtle ways, a narrow set of
values, such as increased commitment, "money ethics," self-interest and
shifting personal/impersonal boundaries, by using a spectrum of incentives
and mechanisms to maintain compliance. I show how, while these may be
thought of as more benign forms of worker control, they can be understood
as no less coercive and, in certain circumstances, may have similar effects
of alienation and exclusion. Resistance to coercive devices in such settings
becomes more passive and atomized, and legislative efforts to regulate the
use of such devices are often limited by the difficulties to define coercion
and render it visible in this context.
Finally, I present a fourth over-arching "meta' type of coercion:
conceptual co-optation. Similar to the way in which critical labor scholars,
such as Karl Klare, have shown a judicial deradicalization of collective
bargaining, I demonstrate the practical deradicalization of the
implementation of the participatory ideal. I describe how studies from
recent years have shown that, in fact, participatory schemes serve to
separate between "low" shop-floor operational decisions and "high"
strategic decision-making, the latter remaining in the hands of employers
even in a "participatory" workplace.
Within this framework, I demonstrate how elements from all four
coercive dimensions have been employed by organizations in both the
"old" and "new" economies. Thus, I assert that the story that has been told
in a historical linear sequence is, in fact, much more dispersed, intertwined
and complex. Different typologies of worker coercion and agency occur in
different segments of the economy, and various control mechanisms are
used within a singular workplace in many, often complementary, ways. A
more complex understanding of coercion and agency in the workday
experience has broad implications for labor and employment law. Labor
regulation, including the prohibition of "company unions,"2 exclusive
representation,3 the "managerial exclusion" rule4 and the doctrine of "fair
2. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2001).
3. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2001).
4. National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2001).
20011
126 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 4:1
representation" by labor unions (Steele v. Louisville)5 are traditionally
informed by our conventional conception of hierarchical, adversarial
relationships. Similarly, employment protections against coercion in the
workplace, including privacy, discrimination, and sexual harassment laws
are constructed with the vision of a powerful individual boss engaged in
top-down decision-making processes. I argue that rethinking our
conceptions of coercive work-related environments can challenge current
assumptions about legal protections and expose our biases in shaping the
lines of desirable and "legitimate" human interaction.
I conclude with the argument that the question of whether labor-
management relations are either adversarial or collaborative-the question
at the core of the complexities of coercion and agency in the workplace and
the linear descriptions of old/new work relations-is inherently
irresolvable. Labor-management relations in most workplace settings
should be understood as simultaneously competitive and cooperative. I
argue that it is within this duality that resistance emerges, and it is the
existence of a multiplicity of channels that can be a source for
empowerment to those at the bottom of (multiple) hierarchies. Therefore, I
suggest that the law support what I term a "constructive tension," requiring
both adversarial collective bargaining schemes and cooperative
participatory schemes, in order to generate spaces for agency and positive
shifts among systemic uses of power in the workplace.
II. THE RATIONALES OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND EMPLOYEE
PARTICIPATION
This section describes the arguments that are used to support and to
oppose collective bargaining and/or employee participation. I divide the
modes of argumentation into two categories: "efficiency" and "legitimacy."
Initially, I assumed that the two categories could be aligned with "pro-
capital" and "pro-labor" arguments. However, as we shall see, there is no
clear alignment between the categories and there is ambivalence in
scholarship from all sides of the political spectrum regarding the
desirability and the actual effects of both unionization and participation.
We shall also see that the two categories of efficiency and legitimacy
cannot be rigidly separated. Both are ambiguous and open-ended terms,
used in different ways in various contexts. The relatively "mainstream"
current approach to efficiency is that of micro-profitability of the firm. In
other words, enlarging the corporate "pie," or more simply, asking what is
6good for business. In this framework, labor is considered as one of the
5. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
6. For critiques of these mainstream frameworks, including the notion of an
unregulated "free" market, see, Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the
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many variables in the production line, and the goal is to keep the best
cost/production ratio possible. When the human factor, workers, is taken
into account as unique (for example, increasing worker satisfaction), it is
done so in the terms of how we perceive the human "function" as a means
to an end. In addition to this narrow approach to efficiency, I also consider
a more "macro" concept of efficiency, including growth, material
distribution and equity.7
"Legitimacy," too, can be deconstructed even before we have begun to
explore its substance. Whose legitimacy? Who are "we," and who speaks
for "us" workers? Is legitimacy an intrinsic goal or is it a mechanism for
rationalizing (illegitimate) processes? All these questions are at the core of
my inquiry. In this section, I consider two types of legitimacy arguments:
one, that of the intrinsic value of participation and membership in the
workplace, including the right to influence an arena which significantly
affects our lives; and two, that of workplace organization as a learning
process for the broader processes of a democratic society.
A. The Economics of Worker Organization
1. Micro-Productivity and Profitability
(a) The Functions of Collective Bargaining
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to
organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the
procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms
of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the
necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a)
Perspectives of Critical Legal Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 465 (Peter Newman, ed., 1998); see also David Kershaw, Manufacturing
Survival: A Critique of Henry Hansmann's and Oliver Williamson's Economic Point of
View, 3-5 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (speaking of the prevalence
of "efficiency" as "king" in the last few decades).
7. Michael Piore, for example, argues that while mainstream theoretical scholarship on
efficiency is based on competitive economic theory, premised on the notion of liberal
individualism, in practice, economics is interested in the concept of growth. Today, newer
theories of economics, including networking theories of organization, derived from Japan,
Germany, and Italy, appear to be in conflict with these understandings of efficiency.
MICHAEL J. PiORE, BEYOND INDIVIDUALISM 95-100 (1995) ("The kind of technological
change for which networks are valued involves intense, direct interaction among individuals
and organizations. Networks are thus the antithesis of the isolated individuals acting
independently, constrained only by income and prices, which constitute the nodes in the
competitive marketplace.").
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impairing the efficiency, safety, or operation of the
instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in the current of
commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or controlling the
flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed goods from
or into the channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials
or goods in commerce; or (d) causing diminution of employment
and wages in such volume as substantially to impair or disrupt
the market for goods flowing from or into the channels of
commerce.
s
Much research has been dedicated to the influence of unionization on
productivity and profitability. 9 However, there are no clear answers, both
because of the complicating variables involved in any such investigation
and because of the diversity among the conceptions, arenas and
constructions of collective bargaining.0 Many law and economics scholars
8. Preamble of National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2001).
9. The legislative history of the Wagner Act has been extensively explored and
debated over. Most scholars agree that the Act had multiple purposes, including industrial
peace, empowerment, efficiency and macroeconomic distribution. See Mark Barenberg,
The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation,
106 HARV. L. REv. 1379, 1412-30 (1993); Kenneth H. Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An
Interview ivith Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 285, 285-
88 (1987).
Karl Klare has offered six goals of the Wagner Act for collective bargaining:
industrial peace; collective bargaining (as a therapeutic mode of exchange); increasing
bargaining power; free choice (allowing the right to association and action collectively);
underconsumption (helping the economy by raising earnings and purchasing power of
workers); industrial democracy-to provide workers with participation and meaning in their
workplace. Karl Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 281-85 (1977). As will
be described in the following sections, I align goals one and five with an economic analysis,
goal three with material redistribution, and goals two, four and six with the legitimacy set of
goals.
Mark Barenberg categorizes American labor law analyses into two categories, "self-
interested rationalism" and "symbolic constructionism," which corresponds with economic
analysis and critical theory. Barenberg, supra at 1382-83. This division could roughly
relate to my categories of efficiency and legitimacy, yet in the following categories,
efficiency contains more than mere self-interest arguments and legitimacy entails more than
mere symbolic benefits.
10. See MICHAEL C. HARPER & SAMUEL ESREICHER, LABOR LAW 13-14 (1996)
(commenting on the multiplicity of complicating variables); Kennedy, supra note 6 (same).
American labor economists and legal scholars are working under the assumptions of
collective bargaining as it has taken form in the United States. There are many other ways
to define labor laws and collective bargaining. I will be discussing some of these other
possibilities throughout the paper. Two important examples are the American prohibition of
"company unions," and the need of direct membership in order to be part of a collective
agreement. See generally ORLY LOBEL, LABOR LAW 1-2, 7-12 (1998) [Hebrew] (exploring
different comparative influences on Israeli labor law including American and European
labor law models); Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further Reflections on the Distinctive
Character of American Labor Laws, 1990 WIs. L. REv. I (speaking of the distinctiveness of
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have argued that unions produce a cartel, which inevitably leads to higher
wages than would be set in a non-unionized (or in an "unregulated" or
"free") market.1' "Unregulated" individual contracting is thought to
enhance efficiency and accuracy in the market whereas labor law functions
to distort the value of labor supply at the expense of productivity,
competition, consumer welfare, and the remainder of the labor market.
12
According to this "market" argument, the competition among firms for
labor will ensure that workers are not under-compensated. 3 Therefore,
protections against layoffs, regulated rigid promotions, and job descriptions
are inefficient because they limit the possibilities of flexible production and
efficient changes through technological advancement, subcontracting, or
outsourcing.14  In addition, scholars claim that giving power to labor
through collective bargaining is inefficient because labor is unqualified to
take into account strategic considerations that are necessary to allow
companies to maintain competitiveness. 5 Another argument forwarded
against unionization is that the diverse interests among workers themselves
inevitably lead to inefficiency in decision-making and to the exclusion of
some workers by others, creating the structure of a dual (primary and
secondary) labor market. 6 Finally, some scholars have simply argued that
unions must be inefficient because otherwise employers would voluntarily
American labor law).
11. See Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988,
1001 (1984) ("[The intended and actual effect of unionization is to raise the price of labor
above the competitive level and to depress the supply of labor below the competitive level
in the unionization sector.").
12. Id. at 999-1002; see also Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38
STAN. L. REV. 991, 1004-05 (1986) (creating an economic model for unions'
monopolization of labor while assuming that "constraint in the labor market necessarily
leads to a constraint in the product market. If a union is successful in its avowed task it will
increase production costs.") Id. at 997; Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor
Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1357 (1983)
(suggesting that the NLRA be replaced by "a sensible common law regime relying heavily
upon tort and contract law"); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U.
CH. L. REV. 947, 982 (1984) ("No system of regulation can hope to match the benefits that
the contract at will affords in employment relations"); Charles Fried, Individual and
Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law and its
Prospects, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 1012, 1019 (1984) (suggesting that the monopolizing
guarantees of labor laws be replaced by individual protections).
13. Posner, supra note 11, at 999-1003.
14. PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 123 (1990).
15. See, e.g., JOHN L. COTTON, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT 119 (1993); Marleen A.
O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-
Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 943 (1993).
16. See, e.g., Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, "Labor's Divided Ranks": Privilege and
the United Front Ideology, 84 CORNELLL. REV. 1542, 1574 (1999).
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organize their employees.17
Responses to these arguments are several. First, regarding the final
argument, scholars point out that employers in many cases are in fact
supportive of organizing the workplace. 8 Thus, as will be discussed later,
historically many employers have sought to form unions within their firms
and have actively aided worker organization. One of the interesting, or
even (at this stage) mysterious, phenomena regarding the enactment of the
NLRA was that some of the most important representatives of capital
supported its enactment. 19  Moreover, several analyses suggest that
managers may have an interest in resisting collective bargaining even when
it is efficient to embrace it.20 This is because unionization may reduce
some of their managerial prerogatives, whereas close control and
intimidation enable managers to keep away from workers as well as public
scrutiny.2' Workers themselves have an incentive to monitor management
efficiency, and in some cases, can play a role superior to that of absent
ownership. Yet, workers will only assume the role of active monitors of
their bosses if they are unionized, and are thus freed from the fear of
discharge.22 The theory of "union shock effect" similarly implies a process
of increased efforts by management in a unionized setting, suggesting that
an increase of wages brought on by worker organization "shocks"
management into increasing efficiency and productivity.23  Finally,
managers may fear that, although in the long-run the overall result of
unionization is increased productivity, the power of unions in distinct times
of struggle may have sharp operational effects on the ability of the
workplace to function during certain periods. These effects will allow
large shifts and instability in productivity, which will be too difficult for
managers to justify and might make the company "look bad" in the eyes of
the public.
Several studies regarding the effects of labor unions have shown that
productivity increases in a unionized workplace.24 Before exploring the
17. Campbell, supra note 12, at 996-97; Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis
of American Labor Law, 91 MICH. L. REv. 419, 470-471 (1992); Posner, supra note 11, at
1000-01.
18. Klare, supra note 9, at 266.
19. Id.
20. RICHARD FREEMAN & JAMES MEDOFF, WHATDO UNIONS Do? 107-109 (1984).
21. Id.
22. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 17, at 431-32; Peter Kuhn, Union Productivity Effects and
Economic Efficiency, 6 J. LAB. RES. 229 (1985).
23. BARRY T. HIRSCH & JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF UNIONS 188
(1986); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 17, at 431-32.
24. For example, see the recent study of Lisa Lynch, What's Driving the New
Economy: The Benefits of Workplace Innovation (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author)(finding that employee voice has a larger positive effect on productivity when it
is done in the context of unionized establishments); see also FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra
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reasons for this effect, it should be noticed that some writers express
skepticism about unions' positive effects on productivity in the long-run.25
Moreover, in certain cases, as a whole, even when productivity increases,
workers' increased power leads to an increase in wages which exceeds the
rise in productivity, and thus reduces overall "profitability" for owners.26
Economists have offered different explanations for the increased
productivity in unionized settings. The most common explanation is that
unions facilitate the enforcement of long-term contracts by preventing
employers from acting opportunistically through the enactment of just-
cause provisions, seniority rules and other such clauses.27 The powers of
collective action (including strikes, protest, and grievance procedures)
ensure the rigidness of contracts, and therefore allow workers to trust these
agreements. Long-term employment is often more efficient for both sides,
particularly when jobs involve firm-specific training, yet individual
negotiations and enforcement of such contracts may have high costs.
2 s
Collective bargaining reduces the transaction costs of attaining job security
by preventing opportunistic behavior by management.29  The detailed
contracts, which are enabled by collective bargaining and are structured to
include promotion ladders and benefits, also magnify the costs of
resignation. 30 In turn, firms can obtain lower wages when they credibly
31secure such promises.
A closely related explanation for increased productivity in the
workplace is that unions are able to voice workers' interests and
note 20, at 166; Maryellen R. Kelley & Bennett Harrison, Unions, Technology, and Labor-
Management Cooperation, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 247-86 (Lawrence
Mishel & Paula B. Voos, eds., 1992) (stating that unions decrease average production time
per unit of output by 31 percent in the metal industry).
25. See generally John T. Addison & Barry T. Hirsch, Union Effects on Productivity,
Profits and Growth: Has the Long Run Arrived?, 7 J. LAB. EcON. 72 (1989) (arguing that
many studies only take into account the effect of unions on surviving firms and are
influenced by firm pricing decisions).
26. David G. Blanchflower & Richard B. Freeman, Unionism in the United States and
Other Advanced Countries, in LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND THE FUTURE ROLE OF
UNIONS 56, 69 (Mario F. Bognanno & Morris M. Kleiner, eds., 1992).
27. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 17, at 432.
28. Id. (stating that long-term contracts usually involve deferred compensation);
Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353, 364-71 (1984).
29. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Employee Involvement in the Workplace Governance
Post-Collective Bargaining: A Retrospective on Selznick's Law, Society, and Industrial
Justice, 7 (working paper, available at http://www.ssm.com) (arguing that "at least among
lawyer-economists in the transaction costs branch of law and economics, the once widely-
held view that unions exist to capture monopoly rents for workers in the form of higher
wages and superior benefits has given way to an understanding that unions play an
important role in reducing transaction costs by constraining strategic behavior by
management").
30. FREEMAN & MEDOEF, supra note 20, at 103-107.
3 1. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 29, at 7.
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dissatisfaction, and to attempt to improve their working conditions.32 By
instituting comprehensive negotiation and arbitration systems, unionization
enables efficient changes in employment patterns rather than changes in
workers.33 Similarly, collective bargaining may serve to overcome the
problems of collective action and "free-riders" in negotiating certain
working conditions, which are "public goods." 34  Without collective
bargaining, each individual worker might fail to negotiate important issues
such as safety and production conditions, and as a result, there may be two
negative effects on productivity. First, such inefficient individual
negotiations may cause high turnover rates of unsatisfied workers. Second,
in the absence of collective bargaining, governments will attempt to
regulate general standards, which are likely to be inefficient, because of
their generality and inaccuracy.35
Moreover, collective bargaining can strike efficient "off the supply
and demand curve" balances in wages, which take into consideration not
only wage levels but also employment levels, and thus avoid inefficient
displacement effects.36 Finally-an argument that will reoccur in the next
section regarding legitimacy-an important reason for increased
productivity in unionized settings is that higher involvement in the
workplace results in more worker dedication, commitment and effort.
Thus, unionization promotes a peaceful and cooperative working
environment and reduces opportunistic behaviors of both sides, violent
conflicts and "industrial strife. 37
32. Richard Freeman, The Exit-Voice Trade-Off in the Labor Market: Unionism, Job
Tenure, Quits and Separations, 94 Q. J. OFECON. 643, 645-46 (1980).
33. As will be discussed in later sections, this might be achieved differently by unions
than by other employee participation schemes because of the "independent" quality of
unions. The role of unions as an independent voice for the collective preferences of
workers, who would otherwise fear expressing their preferences, and its positive effect on
productivity is emphasized by FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 94-109 (offering
empirical evidence that unions reduce worker turnover independent of the incentive of
continued employment that results from higher wages); WEILER, supra note 14, at 181-184.
34. See Keith N. Hylton & Maria O'Brien Hylton, Rational Decisions and Regulation
of Union Entry, 34 VILL. L. REV. 145, 163-67, 175-178 (1989); Leslie, supra note 28, at
364-71.
35. Hylton & Hylton, supra note 34, at 152-55.
36. HARPER & ESREICHER, supra note 10, at 26.
37. Section 141 of the NLRA expresses the goal of "industrial peace" (or the prevention
of "industrial strife") which is good for labor, capital and the market-at-large, in a rather
general way:
Industrial strife which interferes with the normal flow of commerce and with the
full production of articles and commodities for commerce, can be avoided or
substantially minimized if employers, employees, and labor organizations each
recognize under law one another's legitimate rights in their relations with each
other, and above all recognize under law that neither party has any right in its
relations with any other to engage in acts or practices which jeopardize the
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(b) The Functions of Employee Participation
Managers are beginning to realize that in today's competitive
economy workers and management better swim together, or they
will sink together.3s
In recent years, employee participation has increasingly become the
focus of many debates concerning workplace organization.39 Scholars that
are against employee participation argue that managers are most "fit" to
make decisions regarding the firm, since they are the most informed and
skilled. These decisions are too complex to be delegated and decentralized.
Moreover, employees are too diverse in their interests to participate in
decision-making processes of the company.40 Further, they argue that
employees may not be interested in sharing the responsibilities of decision-
making in their firms and that the costs of increasing employee
participation, including the risks of coordination and experimentation will
eventually come out of the wages of employees. In any case, those who
public health, safety, or interest.
It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full flow of
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers
in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful
procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of
the other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with
labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe
practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are
inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in
connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.
National Labor Relations Act § 141, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2001).
38. JOHN R. PHILLIPS, THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS
14 (1994).
39. As will be discussed in the later sections, "participation" is an open-ended term
which may include a vast array of structures, including shop-floor decision making, strategic
decision making, profit sharing schemes and some form of employee ownership. See infra
Section m.C. In this paper, I am mostly limiting the scope of my inquiry to forms of
participation in decision-making, rather than participative schemes in ownership. However,
similar patterns of arguments are made regarding employee ownership. See generally
Herbert Gintis, Financial Markets and the Political Structure of the Enterprise, 11 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 311 (1989); Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work?
ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749
(1990); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective Negotiation and
Implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Response to Henry Hansmann and
Other "Survivalists", 67 FORDHAMi L. REv. 957; Kershaw, supra note 6.
40. Hansmann, supra note 39, at 1780-81 (arguing that heterogeneity of interests in
worker-controlled corporations could lead to inefficiency); Hirsch, supra note 39, at 977-
83(commenting on the divergent interests of workers with respect to risk).
41. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 89-114 (1996); Hansmann,
supra note 39, at 1803-07; Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L. J. 1197,
1207-09 (1984).
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oppose participation claim that in order to maintain competitiveness,
managers must preserve their managerial prerogatives and authority.
Interestingly, despite these arguments, in recent years participation
schemes have been perhaps more justified in the terms of "efficiency" than
in other categories of justification, including legitimacy. Thus, law and
economics scholars, even those describing themselves as offering "a
neoclassical law and economics-based alternative to the prevailing New
Left-ish paradigm, ' 4 have begun to understand that a central function of
current forms of employee participation is increased competitiveness of a
firm. Participation increases productivity by offering an efficient way of
extracting information from employees.43 It thus allows management to
respond to problems in production and organization, receiving feedback
from the employees themselves, a means of collecting information and
implementing change. Further, a form of communication is created
through participatory schemes, which can address the need for coordination
and facilitates integration of processes within a workplace. Information
flow also allows employees to respond flexibly by working extra hard in
difficult times. 44 In this sense, employee participation serves the "voice
function," similar to that described with regard to collective bargaining.
Indeed, many non-unionized workplaces have extensive grievance systems,
which are linked to some form of participation. a Participation can thus
help enhance job security, which in turn encourages employees to take a
longer-run view of the firm's prospects and needs.46 Another advantage of
participation is that it can also efficiently eliminate the need for mid-
managerial positions, by increasing self-monitoring, discipline and
42. Bainbridge, supra note 29, at 1.
43. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: an
Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1010-12 (1998).
44. Richard Freeman & Edward Lazear, An Economic Analysis of Works Councils, in
WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 27 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995).
45. DAVID EWING, JUSTICE ON THE JOB: RESOLVING GRIEVANCES IN THE NONUNION
WORKPLACE 299-308 (1989). Yet, as we shall see, current models of employee
participation do little to protect employees from opportunistic behavior by management;
Bainbridge, supra note 29, at 8.
46. Freeman & Lazear, supra note 44, at 27 (describing co-determination programs in
Germany). See generally Chris Doucouliagos, Worker Participation and Productivity in
Labor-Managed and Participatory Capitalist Firms: A Meta-Analysis, 49 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 58 (1995) (surveying different studies on the effects of participation on
productivity, and arguing that while codetermination and productivity are negatively
correlated, profit sharing, worker ownership, and participation in decision making are
positively associated with productivity. Moreover, finding that these correlations are
stronger among labor-managed firms-firms owned and controlled by workers-than
among participatory capitalist firms-firms adopting one or more participation schemes
involving employees, such as ESOPs or quality circles).
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responsibilities of employees. 47 Thus, economists describe participatory
schemes as a new framework for creating a variety of new pressures on
employees designed to deter "shirking."
48
In addition, allowing employees to participate may reduce the costs of
workplace frictions by increasing loyalty to the firm, and thus can bring
less absenteeism, careless production and turnover.49  In other words,
similar to collective bargaining, employee participation is usually explained
as a means to increase employee satisfaction and morale and thus to
enhance productivity. Finally, in this context, participation can serve as a
way to combat collective bargaining. Many describe the need for
competitiveness vis-a-vis foreign markets as the reason to reduce
"adversarial relations" between workers and management, and thus
advocate the implementation of employee participation schemes, which are
likely to prevent the formation of unions.
2. Macro-Efficiency and Material Redistribution
(a) Collective Bargaining and Employee Participation
For most people, work is the main source of access to material
income, including regular wages and other economic and social benefits,
such as health care coverage, pension programs, disability compensation,
childcare provision, severance pay, and supplemental unemployment
benefits. This is particularly true in liberal welfare regimes, in which
welfare has been structured around the workplace, creating an "employee
welfare state."50
47. Bainbridge, supra note 43, at 1022-28.
48. Id. at 1002 ("Participatory management works well for a sub-set of firms, but is
often adopted by fad-following managers of firms for which it is poorly suited.");
Bainbridge, supra note 29, at 7; Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the
Finn, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 265, 296-97, 315-16 (1998) (describing the prevention of
shirking as a function in structures of employment relations).
49. Freeman & Lazear, supra note 44, at 28-30.
50. See generally GOsTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE
CAPITALISM 26-27, 108-11(1990) (describing Anglo-Saxon nations as liberal welfare
regimes that rely on the market for social protections); John Myles, When Markets Fail:
Social Welfare in Canada and the United States in WELFARE STATES IN TRANsITION:
NATIONAL ADAPTATIONS IN GLOBAL ECONOMIES 116-17 (Gosta Esping-Andersen ed., 1996)
(citing that supporters of the American welfare regime rely on "flexible" labor markets to
lead to job creation and economic growth); David Chamy, The Employee Welfare State in
Transition, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1601, 1606-11 (1996) (discussing the rise and expansion of the
workplace-centered welfare state in the U.S., its current state of crisis, and prospects for its
reform). This is, to me, a perverse aspect of the American welfaref'workfare" regime--on
the one hand centering welfare regulation around the workplace (including regulations such
as ERISA, ADEA, COBRA), thus creating much more dependence of workers on the
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One of the clear purposes of the NLRA was to balance the unequal
bargaining power between workers and employers in order to increase the
power of workers to attain higher wages and material benefits. This was
viewed as desirable not only to workers and to their families, but also to the
broader economy, due to the expansion of purchasing levels that would be
brought by higher wages (for example, workers as consumers).5' Similar
arguments are advanced to support employee participation, which can
increase the voice of employees and allow them to attain better working
conditions. Material distribution also relates to arguments that will be
discussed in the next section regarding legitimacy. If workers do not earn
enough money to sustain themselves, they are unable to fully participate in
democracy. In order for workers to have meaningful participation in the
broad democratic process, they should have suitable access to wealth and
security.
With regard to collective bargaining, studies have found that union
members are likely to receive between ten and twenty percent higher wages
than non-unionized workers.52  Studies also show that unionization
increases wages for unorganized workers, since employers provide wages
and benefits that are competitive with those of unionized firms.53 Thus,
labor unions establish wages through collective bargaining which set a
pattern for compensation that is extended to unorganized workers, and
national labor movements focus on extending the pattern through labor
legislation, securing minimum conditions for all workers. 54
Other writers claim, however, that collective protections can lead to
harmful results by reducing the wages of non-unionized workers. 55
According to these arguments, unionization creates more unemployment,
because higher wages lead to bankruptcy of some firms and to investment
in technology, rather than in labor, by others. Also, unionization may raise
the prices of products, which eventually hurts the working class.56 Finally,
collective organizations exclude some groups of workers, creating a dual
workplace than in other countries, while, on the other hand, in comparison to other
countries, providing very little voice and power for the employee.
51. WEILER, supra note 14, at 121 (citing Daniel J. B. Mitchell, Inflation,
Unemployment and the Wagner Act: A Critical Reappraisal, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1066-
82 (1986)) (providing a critique of the purchasing power goal).
52. HARPER & ESTREICHER, supra note 10, at 13-14.
53. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 151-154.
54. Freeman and Medoff have concluded that, on balance, unions bring greater wage
equality within an establishment, across establishments and between blue-collar and white-
collar workers. "Union wage policies lower inequality of wages within establishments;
union wage policies favor equal pay for equal work across establishments; and union wage
gains for blue-collar labor reduce inequality between white-collar and blue-collar workers."
Id. at 78.
55. WEILER, supra note 14, at 123.
56. Id.
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labor market, in which more vulnerable workers are marginalized and left
unprotected when hired in informal settings.57 In reaction to these sets of
arguments, scholars have responded that even if these were the real effects
of unionization, the source of the problem is the construction of collective
bargaining in the United States, which does not allow for implementation
of collective agreements across industries, applying also to unorganized
sectors. This is also the reason that the increased ("inefficient") wage
premium in unionized workplaces is overstated, since the broader market
economy limits the leverage that workers can gain from unionization."
Another advantage of both collective bargaining and participation
from a macro-efficiency perspective is that they serve the important
function of "perfecting" the market by enhancing the flow of information.59
This argument is linked to attacks against the mere concept of "free
market." In reality, there is no unregulated perfect market in the first place
and most workers cannot effectively negotiate their wages. Without some
form of collective organization, they are more likely to face a "take it or
leave it" situation when confronting the "visible hand," rather than
invisible, of corporate management. 0
(b) Worker Organizations and Individual Protections
Some scholars have argued that if one must interfere with the market,
it is better to provide substantive and procedural individual protections to
all workers rather than the more intrusive and distorting instruments of
collective bargaining or employee participation.61  According to these
arguments, individual protections are more narrowly tailored to cover a
certain range of minimum conditions and apply to all workers. Yet, one
response to this is the problem of under-enforcement of individual
57. For discussion on dual labor markets, see Section 1lI.A.2.
58. WEILER, supra note 14, at 130-133.
59. Id. at 125-26.
60. Id.; Oliver E. Williamson, Emergence of the Visible Hand: hnplications for
Industrial Organization, in MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES 182, 186-93 (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.
& Herman Daems eds., 1980). Another advantage that is suggested is that employers tend
to be more sensitive to workers hired at the margin, employees that are likely to have more
power, those who, because of age or skill, have more alternative employment opportunities,
whereas unions and employee groups have greater incentives to be responsive to the
"average" worker. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 9-10.
61. Epstein, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, supra note 12, at 1357; Epstein, 51 U. CHI. L. REv.
947, supra note 12, at 982; Fried, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 1012, supra note 12, at 1012
(proposing direct imposition of minimal standards and removal of collective labor
guarantees). What is interesting, however, is that very similar arguments are made against
having individual protections, which many view as distorting efficiency, slowing
investment, decreasing employment and curtailing growth. See, e.g., Eddy Lee,
Globalization and Labor Standards: A Review of Issues, 1997 INT'L LAB. REv. 172.
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protective regulations. 62  Non-compliance with labor standards is a
widespread phenomenon and is particularly prevalent with regard to
vulnerable workers in informal "underground" economies-precisely the
workers who are more likely to be non-unionized, and for whom individual
labor protections were primarily designed.
Moreover, as we move on to the next set of arguments, it should be
stressed that unlike individual regulation, worker organization has the
intrinsic advantage of membership and participation. While some material
redistribution could perhaps be achieved outside of the market, the
combination with empowerment cannot. According to this argument, there
is a real difference between redistribution as "hand downs" through
taxation and redistribution by allowing some control over one's own
worklife.
B. The Legitimacy of Worker Organization
1. The Intrinsic Value of Union/Firm "Membership"
Membership is a way of thinking about the psychological contract
between the individual and the organization. If the individual is seen as an
instrument, even an "empowered" instrument, he or she is there to be used
by others for their purposes. Such an instrumental contract, no matter how
well intentioned or how benevolently interpreted, is a denial of democracy.
Our economic well-being and the continued success of capitalism depend
on efficient and effective organizations of all types. One way, perhaps the
only way, to match our needs for democracy in our critical institutions with
our need for efficiency is to think of our organizations as membership
businesses.63
In addition to the instrumental, utilitarian explanations for both
unionization and participation, scholars as well as activists have long
suggested an intrinsic value in both forms of worker organization. These
62. For examples of informal workforces and underground economies, see WEILER,
supra note 14, at 154-160; Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant
Workforce and the Need for Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J.
2179, 2180 (1994); and Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy: Between New Developments
and Old Regulations, 103 YALE L.J. 2289 (1994) (arguing that not only is government
regulation inherently limited, it is also insufficiently enforced absent some form of worker
representation). See generally Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy, in DUAL CITY:
RESTRUCTURING NEW YORK 79 (John Hull Mollenkopf & Manuel Castells eds., 1991)
(discussing "informalization," or the under enforcement of regulation); Saskia Sassen-Koob,
Growth and Informalization at the Core: A Preliminary Report on New York City, in THE
CAPITALIST CITY: GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING AND COMMUNITY POLITICS 138 (Michael P.
Smith & Joe R. Feagan eds., 1987) (same).
63. CHARLES HANDY, THE AGE OF PARADOX 24 (1995).
FOUR DIMENSIONS OF POWER
arguments are based on the fact that the workplace is where a tremendous
proportion of human activity and energy is generated.64 Thus, work is
closely linked to our constructions of agency, identity, personality, or, more
broadly, of the "self.' ,65 Many of the arguments that were used to predict
efficient results within work relations here stand on their own grounds,
including increased motivation, satisfaction, interest, fulfillment, dignity
and human development. These are not merely "symbolic" effects.
Studies often show that worker mobilization is not based solely on
economic self-interest, but also on an appeal to general notions of fairness
and legitimacy.66 For many social theorists and activists, collective
bargaining and employee participation are legitimate forms of community
within the economic enterprise.67 Participation in the workplace, either
through unions or directly, increases the legitimacy of processes and
structures in society, and decisions become more justifiable when forums
for self-expression are provided. The comparison between work and the
political process helps illuminate this rationale. The argument is that the
same justifications for democracy in the government of the state exist in the
context of governing economic enterprises.68 Workers are affected by their
workplace in equivalent ways to citizens by the state, and people should
participate in decisions affecting their interests. In these terms, the goals of
collective bargaining often collapse into the goals of "direct" employee
participation, and both are thought to create a more humane and just
working environment, by increasing workers' voice, self-worth and
esteem.69
In response to these arguments, several objections are made. First, the
idea of legitimation can also be understood as a negative effect. If the basic
premises of separation between work and ownership remains, then limited
forms of worker organization serve to legitimate what is most
fundamentally an illegitimate form of social organization.7 ° On the other
64. Mark G. Kelman, Progressive Vacuums, 48 STAN. L. REV. 975, 979 (1996)
(reviewing MICHAEL J. PIORE, BEYOND INDIVIDUALISM (1995)).
65. See, e.g., JOHN F. WRrE, DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITY AND ALIENATION IN WORK:
WORKER'S PARTICIPATION IN AN AMERICAN CORPORATION (1980).
66. See, e.g., John Godard, Strikes as Collective Voice: A Behavioral Analysis of Strike
Activity, 46 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 161, 162 (1992).
67. See, e.g., PHILIP SELZNIK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 152 (1969).
68. ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 111 (1985).
69. See, e.g., RAYMOND L. HOGLER & GUILLERMO J. GRENIER, EMPLOYEE
PARTICIPATION AND LABOR LAW IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 103 (1992); Cass R.
Sunstein, Rights, Minimal Terms, and Solidarity: A Comment, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 1041,
1058-59 (1984) (arguing that the significance of the Wagner Act is that it creates a right to a
process of workplace decisionmaking with the goal of generating employee participation).
70. Legitimation effects will be discussed in particular in Section V regarding the co-
optive effects of both collective bargaining and employee participation as they have been
constructed in liberal capitalist regimes. See, discussion infra Section V.D.
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side of the political spectrum, a different argument claims that since there
are costs of creating forms of organization and participation in a workplace,
advocating such structures, rather than providing the best mechanisms for
generating the highest profits and thus better material benefits for workers,
is a "paternalistic" approach that does not recognize the real interests of
workers. 7 Moreover, scholars evoke the diversity among workers, which
poses the difficult problem of who will represent workers' preferences and
how will diversity be reflected.72 A complication to this set of arguments is
introduced when we understand preferences and interests as dynamic rather
than pre-existing and static. In this case, arguments regarding "false
consciousness," "paternalism," and "diversity" are all challenged and social
reform can refocus on creating mechanisms to prevent coercion and
exclusion rather than giving up structures of employee voice altogether.
2. The Work Arena as a Learning/Cohesion Process of Democracy
Work has always been central to social reform, not only because of the
intrinsic importance of the workplace arena, but because of the broader
effects of workplace organization on the society at large. Collective
participation not only provides more material benefits and power, and thus
serves as a means for more power in the polity, but it can also be viewed as
a learning process for other arenas. Indeed, participation in any forum of
social life is a learning process, and all aspects of life reflect on each
other.73 Increased involvement around the important arena of work has the
effect of increasing awareness to the political democratic process at large.
Work also serves as a "social melting pot" arena. Participation in
labor unions, employee committees or other forms of collectivity is a
process of cultural learning. For example, Micheal Piore believes that
unions serve as "universal public institutions" where the borders between
groups are open, providing an opportunity to reverse the move of American
society toward particularism. 74 In fact, under such a rationale, the goals of
"industrial peace" are extended to social cohesion among workers
themselves, and thus, among the majority of members of society. Piore
also believes that unions serve the role of introducing a vocabulary of
economic awareness to various groups that are usually isolated from each
7 1. Such arguments are also made against democracy in general, particularly in regard
to developing countries, and their immediate needs for social and economic rights, rather
than political participatory rights. See Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asia
Debate, 15 AUSTRAL. Y. BK. INT'L. L. 1, 5-6 (1994).
72. Freeman & Lazear, supra note 44, at 27-31.
73. See generally A. GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO
GRAMSCI 132-34 (Q. Hoare & G. Smith trans. eds. 1971) (discussing participation in social
life as a learning process).
74. PIORE, supra note 7, at 178.
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other.75 Similarly, Louis Kelso believes that creating forms of employee
participation, particularly by stock ownership plans, will produce "mini-
capitalist" employees that will understand the value of capitalism for a
76society.
C. Are Collective Bargaining and Employee Participation Compatible?
As we have seen in the preceding sections, a very similar genealogy
emerges when paralleling the modes of reasoning of collective bargaining
and employee participation. The two are promoted and resisted for similar
reasons, serve similar functions, and achieve similar results. Yet, at the
same time, the two structures are often considered very different, and even
mutually exclusive, in several different senses. First, their perception in
theory is based on a different "quality" of relations, and many scholars
write within a framework of choosing to support one or the other.77
Second, American law has regulated collective bargaining and participation
schemes as mutually exclusive, and the prohibition of company unions,
which will be discussed later, has led courts to distinguish between union
settings and non-union settings when deciding the legality of employee
participation. Therefore, scholars that support employee participation,
whether as "idealists" or as "realists" who have given up on the
possibilities of unionization, suggest the need to "turn [] the Wagner Act
upside down" in order to allow participatory schemes.7s
75. Id. at 164.
76. See generally Louis 0. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO
(1958); Louis 0. KELSO & PATRICIA HETrER, How To TURN EIGHTY MILLION WORKERS
INTO CAPITALISTS ON BORROWED MONEY (1967); Elana Ruth Hollo, Note, The Quiet
Revolution: Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Their Influence on Corporate
Governance, Labor Unions, and Future American Policy, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 561, 563-64
(1992). Under this rationale, it should be realized that it is unnecessary to distribute stocks
of the workers' own firm. Rather, for decreasing risk, it may be preferable to distribute
stocks of a mutual fund.
77. See generally WEILER, supra note 14, at 225-306 (arguing that cooperative schemes
should be legalized in non-union workplaces); Clyde Summers, Past Premises, Present
Failures, and Future Needs in Labor Legislation, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 9, 19 (1982) (same).
Others have begun to imagine collective bargaining and participation as compatible in a
single workplace. Michael C. Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining with Employee
Supervision of Management, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1988) (arguing that adversarial and
participatory systems can co-exist); Karl E. Kare, The Labor-Management Cooperation
Debate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 39, 43-55
(1988) (same). I generally agree with this position, and will argue for the benefits of
maintaining a constructive tension by allowing both forms in the workplace. See discussion
infra, Section VI.
78. CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEv UNIONISM 254-56 (1988) (arguing for
"associational unionism," a new, more flexible form of unionism which is appropriate in the
new economy).
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Third, pedagogically, in many countries, the two are even studied, if at
all, in different law classrooms--employment and labor laws. 79 In fact, we
could view "the law of work" as encompassing also contract law and
corporate law, along with doctrines of many other fields such as
constitutional law, torts, property, intellectual property, and welfare law.
The following table relates the legal fields of practice, pedagogy and
scholarship, along with the modes of activity of each, which are central to
any reform of the workplace.
PERSPECTIVE CAPITAL LABOR
ORGANIZATION
Individual Action Contract law Employment law
Collective Action Corporate law Labor law
Interrogating this framework, it becomes clear that "blind spots" are
likely to occur within such divisions of thought. For example, it seems that
the discussion regarding a model of participation would most easily be
situated in the law of corporations, yet as a result of the fact that corporate
theorists can refer to the existence of employment and labor laws, such
proposals tend to be marginalized in legal thought.0 Moreover, since labor
law is seen in the United States as less and less relevant, there is a notion
that labor scholars are "transforming themselves" into employment
scholars. And indeed, as I am using throughout the paper, there are
different terms to describe people who work in unionized settings
("workers"), and people who work in non-unionized settings
("employees").
Finally, in practice, collective bargaining and employee participation
typically appear in different industries, more or less aligned with "old" and
"new" economies." Labor law is depicted as creating and conserving rigid
adversarial relations between labor and management, while participation
79. It is important to realize that these internal divisions are neither "natural" nor
necessary. For example, in Israel, employment and labor laws are one discipline and are
taught in the same class. See LOBEL, supra note 10. Pedagogically, I believe that workplace
regulation should be taught in one encompassing course called "the law of work" which
would help surpass rigid divisions that narrow our perspectives and prevent us from
imagining broader ways to achieve social reform.
80. Indeed, in most "Employment Law" text books I have surveyed there was no
mention of any form of employee participation. Employment law courses are usually
focused solely on individual protection and anti-discrimination laws.
81. In the next section, I describe the conventional story of this shift from workers to
employees, in a shift from an "old" to a "new" economy. See infra, Section III.
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schemes are depicted as creating a more flexible, informal collaborative
framework. 82 Moreover, the two are considered in conflict because they
are used as strategies to exclude each other. Thus, some pro-labor scholars
argue that allowing employee participation schemes is a method to resist
unionization.83 Indeed, according to studies conducted by the labor
movement, employee participation programs are among the most effective
anti-union strategies implemented by employers.8 Strikingly, the
supporters of each structure tend to characterize it as empowering for
workers, while describing the other as coercive. All of these issues, and in
particular, understanding the "real" effects of collective bargaining and
employee participation on workers' agency, are at the core of the inquiries
of the following sections.
82. Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of
Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REV. 499, 515-16 (1986); Wilson McLeod, Labor-Management
Cooperation: Competing Visions and Labor's Challenge, 12 INDUS. REL. L.J. 233, 276-80
(1990); Note, Collective Bargaining as an Industrial System: An Argument Against Judicial
Revision of Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1662,
1678-80 (1983).
83. See generally THOMAS A. KOCHAN Er AL., Worker Participation and American
Unions, in CHALLENGES AND CHOICES FACING AMERICAN LABOR 272 (Thomas A. Kochan
ed., 1985) (arguing for allowing employee participation schemes as a method to resist
unionization).
84. HECKSCHER, supra note 78, at 97-98 (explaining that most companies that have
implemented participatory schemes have been anti-union); HOGLER & GRENIER, supra note
69, at 116. Karl E. Kare claims that "all sophisticated union leaders now understand that
they must develop a program on employee participation issues. Many are considering ways
to respond to the [quality of working life] movement not just as a management trap but as an
opportunity, under the proper circumstances, genuinely to improve employees' lives on the
job." Karl E. Klare, Traditional Labor Law Scholarship and the Crisis of Collective
Bargaining Law: A Reply to Professor Finkin, 44 MD. L. REv. 731, 810 (1985) (citation
omitted).
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Table I: Between Collective Bargaining and
Employee Participation





Collective Individual or collective
Indirect participation Direct participation
Old New
III. FROM UNIONIZATION To PARTICIPATION-THE LINEAR ACCOUNT
A. The "Old Economy": Scientific Management and Assembly Line
Production
1. The Taylorist-Fordist Ideology
The era of mass production is marked by narrow, menial jobs, and
strict managerial supervision. At the beginning of the twentieth century,
Fredrick W. Taylor developed his influential theory of "scientific
management," also known as Taylorism.85 In essence, Taylorism was a
management theory concerned with the implementation of strict control
over workers. According to Taylor, managerial planning of the production
process is best centralized with hierarchical monitoring of the performance
of workers.8 6 Tasks should be specified to decrease as much as possible the
85. Before the industrial era, in the 19th century, skilled craftsmen workers had an
information advantage over owners, controlling the knowledge of production and, thereby,
controlling the processes and pace of production. With the move to the industrial assembly
line production, Taylorism enabled management to reverse the information asymmetry. See
SANFORD JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGER, UNIONS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1900-1945 44-49 (1985); Katherine
Stone, The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry, in LABOR MARKET
SEGMENTATION 27, 30-32 (Richard C. Edwards et al. eds., 1975); Bainbridge, supra note 43,
at 983.
86. DANIEL NELSON, FREDERICK W. TAYLOR AND THE RISE OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
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need for thought among workers. 87 Thus, job descriptions should be
extensively detailed, and the production process should be broken down to
small steps, each step assigned to closely monitored individual workers. 8'
Managers should use time and motion studies to develop the rules of
performance of these steps, and the worker should be "deskilled,"
transferring skill to management or to machines.39
Thus, Taylorism also involved a strict line between management and
workers and promoted the use of symbolic structures to increase their
differences, including different modes of payment (workers paid by the
hour, along with incentive payments to increase productivity performance;
management by salary), separate cafeterias, separate entrances, and
separate parking spaces.90
Taylorist management theory was developed hand in hand with the
development of assembly line production, paradigmatically that of the
automobile industry. Henry Ford, the father of the "Fordist era,"
implemented great control over the workers of the Ford Motor Company.
He created a body called the "Sociology Department," which consisted of
social workers and researchers in charge of eliminating the "immoral"
behavior of the company's workers.91 The issues of morality ranged from
cleanliness to smoking cigarettes and gambling.92 The consequences for
immoral behavior were disciplinary sanctions, such as pay-roll
deductions. 93
No one discerned anything improper in investigators [of the
Sociology Department] knocking on the door of workers' homes
to check that the beds were made up, in demanding to see savings
account passbooks, or in requiring an itemization of household
debts. Fellow workers, neighbors, wives, children, and even the
doctors of workers were interviewed.94
Ford's image of the worker was highly paternalistic, attributing to
38-43 (1980).
87. Id. at 90, 137-154.
88. B.J. HODGE ET AL., ORGANIZATION THEORY: A STRATEGIC APPROACH 19-20 (1996);
NELSON supra note 86, at 134.
89. Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, Industrial Relations in Transition: The Paper
Industry Example, 102 YALE L.J. 1803, 1808 (1993); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New
Psychological Contract, 48 UCLA L. REv. 519, 522-23 (citing FREDERICK W. TAYLOR,
PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911)).
90. See HECKSCHER, supra note 78, at 98.
91. ROBERT CONOT, AMERICAN ODYSSEY 175-76 (1974).
92. Id.; see also STUARTBRANDIES, AMERICAN WELFARE CAPITALISM, 1880-1940 88-89
(1970) (describing some negative attributes Henry Ford sought to eliminate from his
workforce).
93. CONOT, supra note 91, at 175.
94. Id. at 176.
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workers such images as "a mind that's weak and a back that's strong. 95
Taken together, the separation between blue-collar workers and managerial
workers in the Fordist-Taylorist era was both theoretical and practical in
the industrial mass production economy.
2. Internal Labor Markets and Dual-Labor Markets
The Fordist era is also linked to the idea of internal labor markets,
with limited ports of entry and rigid promotion ladders, assuring job
security and progressive compensation structures, and creating mutual
dependency between employers and employees. 96 Labor law, as described
in the former section, functioned to facilitate the internal labor market
97structure. Internal labor markets also implied an "outside," creating a
"dual labor market" structure. The workforce was thus divided into
"insiders," who work for large stable firms within the internal employment
patterns, and "outsiders," contingent, part-time, temporary, seasonal, or
simply "atypical" workers, all of whom disproportionately included
minorities, women and immigrants. This latter group of workers, forming
a "secondary labor market," was typically employed in low-waged, low-
skilled, unstable jobs.98 These workers were usually non-unionized and
less protected by labor standards.
95. JOHN R. PHILLIPS, THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS
13 (1994).
96. PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND
MANPOWER ANALYSIS 1-2 (1971).
97. See generally Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of
Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting,
Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1988) (analyzing the interal
labor market model).
98. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, "Labor's Divided Ranks": Privilege and the
United Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1542, 1571 (1999). Some social theorists even
believe that working class fragmentation is a product of deliberate practice of employers,
who benefit from opposition and division within groups of workers, typically along racial
and gender lines. Under this "dual labor market" theory, the upper classes support
discrimination in order to create a segregated dual market in which a reserve army of
marginalized workers is produced, and thus, ultimately, all labor is disadvantaged. Id. at
1574.
In many regimes, including the United States and Israel, this dual structure becomes
even more problematic as a result of centering the welfare structure of the regime around the
stable workplace, creating "a first-class employee welfare state." See, e.g., Chamy, 74 TEx.
L. REV. 1601, supra note 50, at 1606-11.
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B. Managerialism and Flexible Production
1. Flattening Hierarchies and Relational Coordination
For over two decades there have been writings on the "New
Economy." 99 Often referred to as the "post-industrial" economy, the shift
is described as parallel to the great transformation of the labor market in the
late nineteenth century.'00 The term "post-industrial" implies the move to
an economy that is primarily based on services, rather than manufacturing
or production. However, Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, in their
book The Second Industrial Divide, emphasize the continuing reliance on
manufacturing, although less the traditional "mass-manufacturing," even in
the "New Economy."'0 ' According to Piore and Sabel, mass manufacturing
has shifted to less costily production overseas, but the production of
"flexible specialization" remains in the Unites States and requires skilled
workers that can accommodate constant innovation. 10 2 The new production
patterns further require what is termed "relational coordination."'0 3 Piore
has described this as a shift from viewing work as the application of human
force on commodities to viewing work as an interaction between human
beings. ' 4 Others have emphasized that the new organizational models
have blurred the boundaries among constituents of the firm, owners,
clients, customers, suppliers, managers and employees.'05 Thus, such
organizations are claimed to require "a new declaration of interdependence
between those who work in the firm and those who provide the capital; a
new social contract based on mutual obligations and mutual
99. The term "New Economy" is somewhat problematic because many economists
believe that currently we are in something of a transition, in which we witness a mixture
between "old" and "new" features and that the "New Economy," which is yet unknown, is
yet to arrive. Interviews with MIT economists (Jan. 2000).
100. See MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE 5-6
(1984). Early referrals to Postindustrialism are DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-
INDUSTRIAL SocIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL FORECASTING (1973) and ALAIN TOURAINE,
THE POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1971).
101. PIORE&SABEL,supra note 100, at 16-17.
102. Id. at 17.
103. Jody Hoffer Gittell, Organizing Work to Support Relational Coordination (January
2000)(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
104. See Michael Piore, Work Labor and Action: Work Experience in a System of
Flexible Production, in TRANSFORMING ORGANIZATIONS 307 (Thomas A. Kochan &
Michael Useem eds., 1992).
105. See Charles Sabel, Moebius-Strip Organizations and Open Labor Markets: Some
Consequences of the Reintegration of Conception and Execution in a Volatile Economy, in
SOCIAL THEORY FOR A CHANGING SocIETY 23, 25 (Pierre Bourdieu & James S. Coleman
eds., 1991).
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responsibilities."10 6
Within this context, new management and organizational theories
have emerged. The new characteristics of the workplace are said to require
flat hierarchies, complex matrix organization, capacity to tolerate
ambiguity, permeability of organizational boundaries, capacity for renewal,
and mechanisms for self-integrating coordination. °7 Most often referred to
as "managerialism" or "participative management," new managerial
theories advocate a "bottom-up" approach, where innovations in technique
and product are triggered by shop-floor level input. °8 Originating in the
late 1960s, with early experiments of "job enlargement," or what Alfred
Sloan has called "coordinated independence" (borrowing the term of the
Swedish Employer's Federation), these theories advocate a decentralized
decision-making process and an "increase in individual autonomy.'
' 9
Thus, the managerialist model is said to include more expression of
employees' concerns, implementing both participatory structures and
suggestion systems, such as "open doors," surveys and meetings."0 Unions
are claimed to burden such reforms, because they require rigid rules of
"who does what.""'
2. Employability over Job Security
When compared to the traditional internal labor markets, the
emergence of a new economy, marked by a dramatic decline in
unionization, and a shift to "leaner," "outsourcing," "flexible" patterns, has
brought less stability in employment patterns. The number of people
working in contingent patterns is rapidly growing In this sense, the
106. RONALD E. PURSER & STEVEN CABANA, THE SELF MANAGING ORGANIZATION 330
(1998).
107. See Oliver E. Williamson, Emergence of the Visible Hand: Implications for
Industrial Organization, in MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES 182, 186-87 (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.
& Herman Daems eds., 1980); Richard L. Daft & Arie Y. Lewin, Where are the Theories
for the "New" Organizational Forms?: An Editorial Essay, ORG. Sci., Nov. 1993, at i.
"M-form" enterprise is the term for a multidivisional organization of managerial
bureaucracies; see also HECKSCHER, supra note 78, at 87.
108. See Piore, supra note 104, at 307.
109. HECKSCHER, supra note 78, at 92-94 ("Rather than tightening structures of control,
they seek to increase individual autonomy.") (citing ALFRED P. SLOAN, MY YEARS WITH
GENERAL MOTORS 54 (1964)).
110. HECKSCHER, supra note 78, at 98-99.
111. Gittell, supra note 103.
112. In the end of the 1980s, the estimate placed the total number of contingent workers
in the United States at a minimum of 29 million people. These numbers have rapidly grown
over the last decade. The shift reflects both globalization and explicit employer strategies to
subcontract work and redesign jobs. Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in
Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 571 (1997); see also Stanley D.
Nollen, Negative Aspects of Temporary Employment, 17 J. LAB. RES. 567, 569-70 (1996);
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"atypical" outsider worker is becoming more "typical." On the other hand,
there are still clear divisions between "insiders" and "outsiders" in the new
economy. Widespread migration flows of workers from poor countries
have relegated labor-intensive low-wage services and production sectors,
particularly in global metropolitan areas, to an informal, often invisible,
migrant workforce.1 3 Thus, perhaps the new divisions of a new dual-labor
market are better described as divisions between skilled (rather than stable),
upwardly mobile jobs and "dead-end," low-skill jobs.
For the "insiders," new implicit benefits have replaced the job security
and promotions that had been implicit in the "old" employment
relationship.'14 These new terms include "general skills training, upskilling
of jobs, networking opportunities, contact with firm constituents for
employees at all levels of the firm, micro-level job control, market-based
pay, and firm-specific dispute resolution institutions for ensuring
procedural fairness."
'' 5
C. The Decline of Unions and Rise of the Participatory Umbrella
Since their peak in the 1950s, labor unions have been constantly
declining and there are predictions of their further decline in the near
future. Unions represented 34.7 percent of the workforce in 1954, 16.4
percent in 1990, and approximately 14 percent in 1997.1 6 In 1999, the
Anne E. Polivka, Contingent and Alternate Work Arrangements, Defined, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Oct. 1996, at 3; Symposium, Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination,
109 HARv. L. REv. 1568, 1652 (1996); Symposium, The Regulatory Future of Contingent
Employment, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 725, 725-29 (1995).
113. See SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 45-49 (1998)
(describing a process of devalorization of certain sectors in the economy embedded in a
massive growing presence of immigrants in the urban workforce); PETER STALKER, THE
WORK OF STRANGERS: A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION 95 (1994) (stating
that a majority of immigrants in industrialized countries are employed in unskilled manual
work).
114. Stone, supra note 89, at 549-55??? 568-72.
115. Id. at 524.
116. Although 1998 and 1999 have been marked with renewed labor militancy and
strikes, analysts believe that union density will continue to decline in the next century. See
Cramin & Matheny, supra note 98, at 1542 n.3; Charles B. Craver, Why Labor Unions Must
[and Can] Survive, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 15 (1998); Rachel Geman, Safeguarding
Employee Rights in Post-Union World: A New Conception of Employee Communities, 30
COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 369, 370 n.6 (1997); Paul C. Weiler, Hard Times for Unions:
Challenging Times for Scholars, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1015, 1017 (1991); Steven Greenhouse,
Waning Militance: Labor Unrest Masks Peaceful Trend, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1998, § 4
(Week in Review) at 4. It is important to recognize the decline of labor organization not
only in the United States, but as a global phenomena. For example, Israel is also
experiencing the decline of the labor movement. Compared to the United States, the Israeli
labor movement has been more influential in the country's politics and economy for several
reasons. First, the State of Israel was founded on collectivist notions of Jewish
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percent of unionized workers in the private sector was 9.4 percent." 7 The
decline of unionism is depicted both as a reason and as a result of the
changing nature of work and the rise of new forms of employee voice.
In the post-unionization era, some form of employee participation has
been adopted by thousands of American corporations, both in production
and service sectors. 1 8 "Employee participation" (and many other terms,
including "self-management," "co-management," "workplace democracy,"
"co-determination," "employee representation" and "employee
involvement plans" (EIP)) should be understood as a wide continuum,
ranging from shop-floor operational consulting to strategic policy-making.
The definitions of the different programs are not sharp and often terms are
used interchangeably. In the following pages, I suggest a brief taxonomy
for these programs. I return to these differences throughout the next
sections, particularly with regard to what I will describe as the "practical
deradicalization of the participatory ideal," in Section V.
ethno-republicanism and its shaping was influenced by social theorists and politicians.
Second, the idea of "Hebrew labor" was at the root of Zionism, the return to "the promised
land" and the transformation of the "Diaspora Jew" to the "Tsabar," the autonomous,
Israeli-born, hard-working Jew. Thus, the Israeli labor movement, and especially the
Federation of Jewish Labor in Israel (the Histadrut), had an historical role in the formation
of the state and had accumulated much power in the political arena. The Histadrut was
founded in 1920, twenty-eight years prior to the foundation of the State of Israel, and one of
its goals was to encourage divisions among Jewish and Arab workers, while fostering
solidarity between Jewish workers and Jewish employers. A central explanation to the
diminishing power of labor unions in Israel is the Israeli "Americanization"- the on-going
processes of privatization, individualization and constitutionalization- has brought more
hostile decisions to the courts towards unions and more focus on individual rights and
competitive economic growth. See LOBEL, supra note 10, at 1-12, 161-68; Ran Hirschl,
Israel's 'Constitutional Revolution': The Legal Interpretation of Entrenched Civil Liberties
in an Emerging Neo-Liberal Economic Order, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 427, 439. See generally
MICHAL SHALEV, LABOUR AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY IN ISRAEL (1992) (discussing the
diminishing power of labor unions in Israel).
117. Union Members in 1999, Bureau of Labor Statistics Press Release, (Jan. 19, 2000),
at htftp://l146.142.4.23/publnews.releaselHistory/union2.0127200.news (stating that
government workers' unionization rate was 37.3 percent).
118. The new forms of participation have been implemented both in new companies and
in traditional production and sales companies, such as General Electric, General Motors,
Xerox, Wal-Mart, McDonald's, and the traditional source of Fordism, the Ford Corporation.
PHILLIPS, supra note 95, at 14-19; see also Bainbridge, supra note 43, at 981; Klare, supra
note 84, at 810-811 (noting that about 32 percent of workers in businesses employing 100 or
more employees are involved in some form of employee participation program). According
to Charles Heckscher, the programs of employee involvement in the last few decades were
only of partial success. A pattern emerged in which a program would be experimented with,
stories of success would be told, and then, without clear reasoning, the particular effort
would wither away, yet without slowing the general enthusiasm for other employee
involvement plans. HECKSCHER, supra note 78, at 86-87.
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1. Self-Managed Teams
Typically, a "self-managed (or "self-directed") team" consists of
approximately a dozen employees at the shop-floor level, organized around
certain areas of production and authorized to make collective decisions
about day-to-day work problems. n 9 Teams are often characterized by job
rotations and on-going training, and each team member is usually trained to
perform most of the team's tasks.120 Some teams are created (and its
employees are hired) especially for a specific short-term project, thus
serving also as an employment strategy to create more flexible jobs and to
reduce long-term permanent employment.12 ' Often teams elect team
leaders who serve representative functions vis-a-vis the rest of the
organization.
122
2. Quality of Work Life
Quality of Work Life programs (QWL), or "employee-action
committees," are small groups of employees, who, usually on a voluntary
basis, represent the employees in forming recommendations for
management concerning work-related conditions.' 23 Committees with such
general characteristics are also called "focus groups," "human resource
programs" or "employer-employee committees."
3. Quality Circles
Quality circles are small groups of employees that form to discuss
productivity, procedures, and product and service quality. 24  These
programs differ from the QWL programs in their almost sole focus on
productivity and quality, without involving any focus on working
conditions. They originate from management theories, including the well-
119. JOHN L. COTrON, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT 174 (1993); Bainbridge, supra note 43,
at 989.
120. Bainbridge, supra note 43, at 989-90.
121. Michael H. LeRoy, Can TEAM Work? Implications of an Electromation and
Dupont Compliance Analysis for the TEAMAct, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 215, 216 (1996).
122. Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace
Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 760-61
(1994).
123. Bainbridge, supra note 43, at 987. See generally MIKE PARKER, INSIDE THE CIRCLE:
A UNION GUIDE TO QWL (1985) (discussing the QWL form of organization); DONALD M.
WELLS, EMPTY PROMISES: QUALITY OF WORKING LIFE PROGRAMS AND THE LABOR
MOVEMENT (1987) (same).
124. JEROME T. BARRETT, LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE:
AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 3-6 (1985); Bainbridge, supra note 43, at 987-88.
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known Japanese model of Total Quality Management (TQM). 25 In recent
years, permanent quality circles have been widely replaced by temporary
problem-solving teams.
126
4. Representation on Boards and Work Councils
Work councils and "employee representation plans," establishing
worker representatives who communicate with management are very rare
in the United States, but continue to play a significant role in Europe. 127
These programs involve periodical elections of representatives, who meet
with management to discuss grievances, shop-floor operational problems
and less frequently, wages and benefits. Most often, however, final
authority over all decisions, including grievances, remains with
management. 28 Some forms of representation, more likely to be found in
European models of "co-determination," allow a vote to the representatives
at the company's boards or in other decision-making processes.
5. Labor-Management Cooperation Committees
Labor-Management Cooperation plans are participatory plans within
unionized settings. Under these plans, committees usually consist of
management and union officers, who discuss general issues, primarily
regarding the collective bargaining relationship and specific issues such as
work conditions, safety and workplace environment. 29 They differ from
simple collective bargaining in their more frequent informal discussions
with management.
6. Profit-Sharing Programs
Many firms, particularly those in the high-tech industries, have
125. EDWARD E. LAWLER ET AL., EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AND TOTAL QUALITY
MANAGEMENT: PRACTICES AND RESULTS IN FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES (1992); Edward E.
Lawler, Total Quality Management and Employee Involvement. Are They Compatible? 8
MANAGEMENT EXECUTIVE 68, 68-76 (February 1994); Andrew Polland, The Emergence of
Self-Directed Work Teams and Their Effect on Title VII Law, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 931, 933
(2000).
126. Bainbridge, supra note 43, at 987-88.
127. Freeman & Lazear, supra note 44, at 27. These forms of participation were one
common form of "company unions" in the past, but have vanished from the U.S. since the
1920s. See Barenberg, supra note 9, at note 16.
128. See Barenberg, supra note 9, at note 16.
129. See generally BARRETT, supra note 124, at 3-4 (defining Labor-management
cooperation as the use of committees usually comprising equal numbers of union and
management officers who meet regularly, to discuss work related issues); DON DEWAR, THE
QUALITY CIRCLE GUIDE TO PARTICIPATION MANAGEMENT (1980) (same).
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constructed some form of profit-sharing programs, which may include
collective or individual ownership of stocks or firm assets (Employee Stock
Ownership Plans (ESOP)), 30 or simply structural bonuses that are linked to
profits of the firm (Gain Sharing Programs, including Scanlon plans and
Improshare plans),t3 t usually without providing for power in decision-
making. This paper focuses mainly on decision-making forms of
participation, rather than on profit participation programs.
Table II: "Old" and "New" Workplaces
Structure Hierarchical supervision Horizontal coordination
Management Theory Scientific Management Managerialism
Production Assembly-line mass production Flexible production; Services
Firms Large, self-sufficient Lean, outsourcing
Strength of Firm Material resources Human capital
Labor and Capital Markets Local Global
workforce Relatively homogenous Diverse
Working Format Individuals Teams
Job Rigid classification, narrowly Flexible, more cross-
defined, routinized functional tasks, multi tasked
Work Menial "deskilled" Intellectual and emotional,
"thinking" skills
Worker Blue-Collar Worker White-Collar Worker
Workers' Expectations Stability, security Employability, mobility
[Internal labor markets] [Networking]
Labor-Management Relations Adversarial Cooperative
Worker Organizations Traditional collective bargaining Employee participation
labor unions programs
Participation Representatives Direct / Representatives
130. See generally KELSO & ADLER, supra note 76 (supporting the distribution of stock
to workers in order to broaden their financial bases. However, Kelso, who is considered the
"father" of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP), did not support other forms of
worker participation that would reduce management control over the firm.; KELSO &
HETTER, supra note 76 (same). See also, Hollo, supra note 76, at 562-64 (explaining the
workings of an ESOP as a stock bonus plan or a money purchase plan).
131. Scanlon plans link profit sharing to other forms of participation, such as making
suggestions to improve the workplace, while Improshare plans are linked to increases in
profits for the company or productivity bonuses. JOHN L. COTrON, EMPLOYEE
INVOLVEMENT 89-95 (1993); Bainbridge, supra note 43, at 988-89.
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IV. KEEPING THE MOTION
A. The Terms Coercion and Agency
In 1964, Robert Blauner in his classic study, Alienation and Freedom:
The Factory Worker and His Industry, compared different industries and
how they contributed to workers' sense of freedom or alienation. 32 He
suggested that "the nature of a man's work affects his social character and
personality.., and his over-all sense of worth and dignity. ' 33  Blauner
found that different industries used different methods of authority over
workers and evoked different modes of resistance by workers.'
34
In this paper, I accept these effects when comparing collective
bargaining and employee participation in different work settings. In my
exploration, I use the term coercion, rather than, alienation or domination,
and the term agency, rather than freedom or autonomy. One reason for my
choice of terminology is my background in feminist jurisprudence. 35 But
more than a mere "habit," I believe that using these concepts can avoid
some of the problems of other terms. Coercion has been explored in legal
theory in a variety of contexts. Realists have shown how the term should
not be construed formalistically, and how coercion and "freedom" should
be understood as a continuum. 36  While both the terms "coercion" and
"domination" appear in labor laws, 137 coercion is broad and more open-
132. R. BLAUNER, ALIENATION AND FREEDOM: THE FACTORY WORKER AND His
INDUSTRY (1964).
133. Id. at 122.
134. Blauner similarly compared the utilization of technology in different industries and
its effect on the meaning and purpose of work. He suggested, for example, that in the face
of dehumanizing work, auto workers retain their dignity by collectively resisting authority
and engaging in protests. Id.
135. In particular, Kathy Abrams has written extensively using this pair of terms, see
generally the following three articles: Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency:
Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1999); Kathryn
Abrams, Redefining Women's Agency: A Response to Professor Williams, 72 IND. L.J. 459
(1997); Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995).
136. Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, in DUNCAN KENNEDY,
SEXY DRESSING ETC. 83 (1993); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly
Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); see also PETER BACHARACH & ARYEH
BOTWINIK, POWER AND EMPOWERMENT (1992).
137. Section 8(a)(1) prohibits employer practices that "interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees" in the exercise of their Section 7 rights to self-organization, collective
bargaining, and other concerted activities. Section 8(a)(2) prohibits employers from
"dominat[ing] or interfer[ing] with the formation or administration of any labor organization
or contribut[ing] financial or other support to it." National Labor Relations Act § 8(a), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a) (2001).
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ended. Rather than being hermetic and total, it implies spaces for
resistance and agency. Agency seems more open-ended than "freedom" or
autonomy. It implies dynamic relations to others, rather than "a static
human characteristic to be posited as a presupposition. '38
B. The Symmetry Between Institutions and Their Counter Institutions
In the following sections, which explore the four dimensions of
coercion, I suggest that there are relations between certain patterns of
work/production organization and corresponding forms of workers'
organization/resistance. I argue that both as a descriptive historical matter,
and as a rhetorical move of legal scholarship, collective bargaining is
linked to hierarchical work relations and employee participation is linked to
a horizontal organization of work. I further suggest that in a more
internalized disciplinary setting, resistance will tend to be more passive and
individuated. Finally, I suggest that both concepts of collective bargaining
and employee participation have been "deradicalized" when they shifted
from theory to practice. Hence, I describe the following structure of






In this sense, I partly adopt the linear account of the shift from an
"old" to a "new" workplace as paradigmatic to the different typologies I
explore. However, I also emphasize that this picture is much more
complex than a simple chronological shift. First, as described in the
previous section, there are always many weak workers who do not fit into
either paradigm, and who have formed a "secondary market," "informal
138. Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATnONS
162, 168 (1990) (describing the concept of "autonomy" in legal tradition informed by liberal
political theory). See generally Boyle, supra note I (discussing liberal and postmodern
versions of agency and subjectivity); Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of
the Self, 105 HARv. L. REv. 959 (1992) (offering an alternative view of responsibility based
not on assumptions of free will but on a conception of the self as constantly constituting
itself).
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workforces," or "underground economies." 39 Second, currently, we are
facing a "mixed regime," in which both "old" and "new" forms of
employment coexist. Most importantly, no single corporation is a clear-cut
example of one of these types, and we will see how in many workplaces all
coercive dimensions are present. Finally, often one coercive dimension can
be embedded in other coercive dimensions. This is also one of the reasons
that the four dimensions cannot be sharply separated, since, as we shall see,
often even when coercion is horizontal or internal, it can still be traced to
an orchestrating hierarchical hand.
V. THE COURSE OF POWER: FOUR DIMENSIONS OF COERCION
A. The First Dimension: Vertical Coercion
The predominance of hierarchy in both public and private life
leads to a profound loss of th[e] sense of social connection
because it breaks down any possibility of real community, and
forces people into a life-long series of isolating roles and routines
within which they are unable to fully recognize one another in an
empowering and mutually confirming way.140
1. Economic Weapons, Company Unions, and Managerial Exclusion
The first type of coercion within the workplace, hierarchical or
vertical, is the most intuitive. We understand the workplace as consisting
of asymmetrical power relations between management and workers.
Although today this dimension seems the most "natural" and clear to
explain, here too there was a move from a very narrow concept of
hierarchical coercion to a broader understanding. Although legislators and
courts regularly regulate and explore this dimension, often, particularly in
the past, these regulations had been interpreted narrowly. An illustrative
example is the Coppage case from 1915, in which the Supreme Court
interpreted the breadth of a Kansas statute, which declared it unlawful for
an employer to "coerce, require, demand, or influence" any person to enter
into a "yellow dog contract," a promise not to join a union.'4 ' The majority
held that an employer who tells his workers they will be fired if they refuse
to sign could not be prosecuted under this law, since:
139. Discussion supra Section IV.A.
140. Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal
Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369, 371 (1982).
141. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (emphasis added).
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Aside from th[e] matter of pecuniary interest, there is nothing to
show that [the worker] was subject to the least pressure or
influence, or that he was not a free agent, in all respects
competent, and at liberty to choose what was best from the
standpoint of his own interests. 4 '
The enactment of the NLRA marked a sharp move from this narrow
approach to hierarchical coercion in the workplace. The 1930s background
to the enactment of the Act was distrust and violence between labor and
management. The regulation of labor relations was thus based on the
premise of adversarial relations and the need for protections and economic
weapons in order to counter management's asymmetrical power over
workers.
It must be realized that collective bargaining, under a system
where the Government does not attempt to control the results of
negotiations, cannot be equated with an academic collective
search for truth-or even with what might be thought to be the
ideal of one. The parties-even granting the modification of
views that may come from a realization of economic
interdependence-still proceed from contrary and to an extent
antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest. The system
has not reached the ideal of the philosophic notion that perfect
understanding among people would lead to perfect agreement
among them on values. The presence of economic weapons in
reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is
part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley
Acts have recognized.'4 3
Paul Weiler describes some of the measures that employers continue
to use to suppress unionization. Many of these practices are illegal under
the NLRA, nonetheless they have been widespread in the last several
decades.'44
[A] vigorous campaign against the union in which management
regularly raises the spectre of strikes and job losses, and adds
credibility to the threats through selective discriminatory action
against key union supporters. If the union wins the election
nonetheless, the employer will simply carry on its resistance at
the next stage by stonewalling at the bargaining table, forcing the
union members out in strike, and hiring permanent replacements
to fill their jobs, thus confirming the accuracy of the employer's
initial campaign prognostications, but too late for these
142. Id. at 8-9.
143. NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960) (emphasis added).
144. WIELER, supra note 14, at 112.
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workers. 45
Because of this reality, Weiler has argued for the expansion of the
economic weapons granted by the NLRA to workers, in order to revive
American unionization.
46
However, despite its weaknesses, the NLRA does provide a set of
economic weapons for workers, and prohibits coercive practices of
employers. Section 8(a)(1) prohibits employer practices that "interfere
with, restrain, or coerce" workers in the exercise of their Section 7 rights to
self-organization, collective bargaining, and other concerted activities.1
47
Section 8(a)(2) prohibits employers from "dominat[ing] or interfer[ing]
with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribut[ing] financial or other support to it.'
' 48
The latter prohibition is, in effect, the prohibition of "company
unions," for example, unions "dominated" by employers, which represents
the clear need for workers to assume certain independence within a
hierarchical relationship. It is important to note that courts have inquired
into the legality of employee participation schemes using solely this
standard of independence versus hierarchical coercion, for example,
"domination by employer." In Electromnation, the National Labor Relations
Board (NRLB) held that an employer violated section 8(a)(2) when it
established "employee-action committees."'' 49  These committees were
145. Id. at 111; see also FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 20, at 221-45.
146. See Paul Weiler, Promises To Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769, 1805 (1983) (asserting that union certification
should be on basis of signed authorization cards rather than a long organizing campaign and
an election which employers can suppress); Paul Weiler, Striking A New Balance: Freedom
of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REv. 351, 404-19
(1984) (suggesting reversal of rule allowing permanent replacement of strikers and
loosening of secondary boycott restrictions); see also WEILER, supra note 14, at 185
(proposing expanded protection for union's economic weapons).
147. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2001).
148. Id. Section 2(5) of the NLRA defines a "labor organization" as "any organization of
any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
conditions of work." National labor Relations Act § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2001). In
June 1996, Congress passed the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act (TEAM).
However, the act was vetoed by President Clinton. Without sufficient votes in Congress to
override the presidential veto, TEAM was not enacted. TEAM offered to amend section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA to allow non-unionized employers to establish and participate in
worker-management groups. See Teamwork for Employees and Management Act, S. 669,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see also Alvin L. Goldman, Potential Refinements of
Employment Relations Law in the 21st Centuiy, 3 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 269,
290-99 (1999).
149. Electromation, Inc. & Int'l Bd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 1049, AFL-CIO &
"Action Committees" 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148, 147 L.R.R.M.
2257 (7th Cir. 1994).
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comprised of six employees and one or two members of management to
discuss issues such as bonuses, no-smoking policies, and raises. The court
affirmed that these committees were unfairly dominated by the employer,
because the employer had structured the committees, was involved in
structuring its proposals, and paid the employees for their time on the
committee.15 0  Thus, the committees were held to be a violation of the
NLRA.
5 1
Mark Barenberg, who has explored in two comprehensive articles the
prohibition of "company unions" and its relevance to today's economy,
explains that, "[i]n Wagner's institutional ideal, company-union-like
collaborative structures such as works councils and joint labor-management
committees would emerge and operate effectively and non-manipulatively
only within the protective shell of independent unionism."'
52
The idea of securing a separate "clean" space (or "shell") for workers,
free of coercive powers, is also embodied in the NLRA's "managerial
exclusion" rule. Section 2(3) of the Act excludes "managerial employees"
or "supervisors" from the definition of employees that can form a
bargaining unit.153 Section 2(11) defines the term "supervisor" as:
Any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer,
to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to
direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
150. Id.
151. See also E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (1993) (holding that
employee participation committees in a unionized-setting are illegal if they discuss anything
other than concerns of quality and production; discussing issues such as work benefits
violated section 8(a)(2) and "bypassed the union and fostered [an illegal] competing
organization").
152. Barenberg, supra note 9, at 1391, 1442-59 (arguing that banning the company-
union for the reasons of preventing despotism is inconsistent with the permission of
remaining a non-unionized workplace). According to Senator Wagner: "[tihe company
union is generally initiated by the employer; it exists by his sufferance; its decisions are
subject to his unimpeachable veto." Therefore, company unions raised "[m]ajor questions of
self-expression and democracy.... At a time when politics [was] becoming impersonalized
and when the average worker [was] remote from the processes of government, it [was] more
imperative than ever before that industry should afford him real opportunities to participate
in the determination of economic issues." Senator Wagner also believed that "industrial
strife is most violent when company unionism enters into the situation... [because] the
company union line of organization is least likely to bring forth the restraint of irresponsible
employees by others of their own group." Michael H. LeRoy, Employer Domination of
Labor Organizations and the Electromation Case: An Empirical Public Policy Analysis, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1812 (1993) (citing Sen. Wagner at 78 CONG. REc. 4229, 4230
(1934)).
153. Section 2(3) of the NLRA states: "The term 'employee' ... shall not include...
any individual employed as a supervisor." National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. §
152(3) (2001).
2001]
160 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 4:1
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. 1
54
The rationale of this exclusion is again to protect the separate sphere
of rank-and-file workers and to prevent the inclusion within a bargaining
unit of employees who will have a "conflict of interest" that will "hinde[r]
the functioning of the adversarial model of labor-management relations."'
The notion of the importance of a separate collectivity that serves to
mediate between groups of people is a powerful one that recurs in many
social contexts. 56  However, it is important to notice that within a
hierarchical framework, separate entities that counter the vertical power
tend to become a "black box," in which intra-group struggle is often
overlooked.
2. The Representation Model and Labor's United-Front
From one perspective, unionization has been and can be viewed
as an activity of the employees themselves, whereby they
participate as a group in the improvement of their own working
conditions. In its current image, though, the union is usually
perceived as an entity external to the employees: as a large,
bureaucratic organization whose full-term officials periodically
negotiate a long-term contract behind closed doors with the
employer, and then represent a fairly small number of employees
who are aggrieved by the way management administers the
contract during its lifetime.
157
The NLRA collective bargaining model is based on the idea that
workers should present a unified voice to advance their common goals.
The NLRA requires a well-defined form of representation, which involves
154. National Labor Relations Act § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2001).
155. Pairick S. Bryant et al., Hybrid Employees: Defining and Protecting Employees
Excluded from the Coverage of the National Labor Relations Act, 41 VAND. L. REv. 601,
602 (1988).
156. For example, similar ideas are found in debates regarding development and entity,
and the notions of "separation" in international law (as in the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process). Another example is that of religion and churches, which have been described as
providing "a separate sphere from the sphere of state control ... [allows] their members to
work out understandings of reality that are often quite different from those of the powerful
groups of individuals known as the state," which can lead to progressive resistance. Stephen
Carter, Comment: The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107 HARV. L. REv. 118, 136
(1993).
157. WEILER, supra note 14, at 11-12 (1990) (emphasis added). Similarly, Jamin Raskin
criticizes collective bargaining under the NLRA because it treats union participation as a
"foreign entity," rather than an "organic 'activity"' that is essential to employees. Jamin B.
Raskin, Book Review: Reviving the Democratic Vision of Labor Law, 42 HASTINGS L.J.
1067, 1071 (1991).
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strict separation between leadership and grassroots activities, demands
loyalty to the group from its members, and requires that representation be
exclusive. Sections 8 and 9 grant exclusivity to the majority union, that is,
the union that wins the most votes in an election and its representatives are
the only ones who can bargain on behalf of all the workers in the
bargaining unit, including non-members. 59 Union leaders are given
disciplinary powers over members and may suspend members for being
"unloyal," for example, for forming a separate caucus. 60 Paul Weiler,
consistent with his aforementioned suggestions to increase economic
weapons in order to revive the labor movement, has also suggested the
regulation of more union powers that would enable unions to discipline
their members. 6'
Hence, some have described American labor law as a mini-model of
representative democracy, promising "the same rewards and confront[ing]
the same problems as its parent and archetype, liberal democracy.' 62 The
metaphor of a mini-democracy is illuminating: the NLRA functions as the
constitution of the regime, providing structure, organization and ensuring
the rights of workers. 16  The NLRB serves as the administrative body,
supervising the election of unions by workers to represent them in the
"legislative process" of collective bargaining.' 64  The labor agreement
becomes the industrial code applicable to the particular workplace.
65
Therefore, although collective bargaining could be imagined as a strong
form of workplace participation, "the structure of conventional collective
bargaining has not been particularly encouraging toward day-to-day
employee participation."'
66
What is striking is that the hierarchical structure of NLRA unions was
158. On the dangers of the "loyalty duty" in the context of social movements, see Janet
E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of Representation, in THE
POLITCS OF LAW 115, 126 (David Kairys ed., 1988) ("Here is a dangerous point in
intragroup politics. When group members promote a duty of loyalty they implicitly ask
internal dissenters to fall silence.").
159. The employer is obliged to bargain exclusively with the union representing the
majority of the workers. N.L.R.A. §§ 8(a)(5), 9(a), 9(c), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a),
159(c) (2001). See also Crain & Matheny, supra note 16, at 1555; Alan Hyde et al., After
Smyrna: Rights and Powers of Unions That Represent Less than a Majority, 45 RUTGERS L.
REv. 637, 639 (1993).
160. Martha Gruelle, Democracy is Power: Rebuilding Unions from the Bottom Up,
Lecture at Harvard Trade Union Program (Mar. 6, 2000) (describing the "Carpenters for
Democratic Union" and SEIU in California).
161. Weiler, Striking A New Balance, supra note 146, at 404-19.
162. Steven L. Willbom, Industrial Democracy and the National Labor Relations Act: A
Preliminary Inquiry, 25 B.C. L. REV. 725, 725 (1984).
163. Id. at 728-731.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Klare, supra note 84, at 808-809.
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conceptualized at a time of overt exclusion of workers by unions. At the
peak of the labor movement struggle, the labor movement was a relatively
homogenous exclusionary movement. Such homogeneity made it
relatively easy to universalize "the worker" as a white, male, English-
speaking, able, American worker. Up until the New Deal, and in some
cases even after, unions widely practiced overt exclusion of minorities,
women and immigrants. 167 During the Lochner era, almost all labor unions
engaged in race discrimination, ranging from complete exclusion to
internal segregation. 168 Due to this exclusion, employers consistently used
black strikebreakers during strikes.
169
Women were excluded from unions for the double fear that women
would take men's jobs (and perhaps decrease wages) and that their work
would weaken the nuclear family. 170 Even when women were allowed to
join unions, it has been argued that this was because the American
Federation of Labor (AFL) understood that it would be easier to control
women from within the unions. 17 1 When unions finally admitted women to
their ranks, many unions "engaged in exclusionary tactics ranging from
holding late-night meetings in saloons, where women were unwelcome
without escorts, to ridiculing women who spoke at the meetings.' 72
As the workforce grew more diverse and overt exclusion from union
ranks was no longer possible, the majoritarian rule of the NLRA served as
a basis for covert exclusion. During the 1940s and '50s, discriminatory
collective bargaining agreements were signed by unions. These included
clauses that blocked the hiring of African-Americans and married women
as well as clauses that forced women who married to resign. 7  The first
167. See PHILIP FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
POLITICS AND PRACTICES OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, 1900-1909 219-32,
256-81 (1964).
168. David E. Bernstein, Roots of the "Underclass": The Decline of Laissez-faire
Jurisprudence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 92 (1993).
169. See generally Warren C. Whatley, African-American Strikebreaking from the Civil
War to the New Deal, 17 Soc. SCI. HIST. 1525 (1993) (discussing the history of black
strikebreakers).
170. Marion Crain, Benveen Feminism and Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex
Equality, and Labor Speech, 82 GEO. L. J. 1903, 1942; Alice Kessler-Harris, Where Are the
Organized Women Workers?, 3 FEM. STUD. 92, 95-97 (1985).
171. Kessler-Harris, supra note 170, at 97-98.
172. Id. at99.
173. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); see also
HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 26 (1977) ("[Niational
labor law was, until 1964, concerned almost exclusively with the regulation of relations
between management and organized labor, leaving such 'third parties' as blacks and women
unprotected from discriminatory employment practices."); Marion Crain, Women, Labor
Unions, and Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment: The Untold Story, 4 TEx. J.
WOMEN & L. 9, 62 n. 242 (1995) (citing Nancy Gabin, Women and the United Automobile
Workers' Union in the 1950s, in WOMEN, WORK AND PROTEST 259, 264 (Ruth Milkman ed.,
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move away from overt discrimination was to increase scrutiny over the
internal structures and processes within unions by the development of the
fair representation doctrine. Although the NLRA did not include such an
obligation, over time courts required unions to represent every worker in a
bargaining unit fairly. The duty was first articulated in Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R. in regard to the Railway Labor Act. 74 The Court held
that a union could not bargain for an agreement that discriminated against
the African-American members of the bargaining unit.7 5  The Court
explained that the duty to represent fairly was an implied obligation
stemming from exclusive representation. Later cases further developed
the fair representation doctrine to encompass a wider prohibition against
discriminatory practices.177 By failing to fairly represent its members, the
union itself may be liable under Title VII for breach of duty.
178
Although the doctrine of fair representation was an important step in
decreasing internal discrimination within a hierarchical structure of worker
organization, many writers have commented on the weakness of the
doctrine and have pressed the need for its reform. 179 Most problematic is
that it is often the case that goal definition cannot be read as discrimination,
since the focus on wages and material benefits is widely understood to be
the lowest common denominator of all workers. Discrimination is usually
not perceived as such if it merely involves an omission to bargain on
various issues that are more central to the lives of certain workers. Because
1985)); Herbert Hill, Race, Ethnicity and Organized Labor: The Opposition to Affirmative
Action, NEw POL., Winter 1987, at 31, 33 (arguing that labor unions "functioned primarily
to advance the interests of white workers, to guarantee them privileges in the labor market").
174. Steel v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). The rule of fair
representation was later applied to the NLRA in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330
(1953).
175. Steele, 323 U.S. at 204,207.
176. Id. at 204.
177. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-91 (1967) (stating that a labor union
may not use its discretion partially, arbitrarily, or in bad faith).
178. Id. at 190.
179. For examples of articles that are dedicated to reforming the fair representation
doctrine see the following: Ross E. Cheit, Competing Models of Fair Representation: The
Perfunctory Processing Cases, 24 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1982); Martin H. Malin, The Supreme
Court and the Duty of Fair Representation, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 127 (1992); Lea S.
VanderVelde, A Fair Process Model for the Union's Fair Representation Duty, 67 MINN. L.
REV. 1079 (1983). See also Michael J. Goldberg, The Duty of Fair Representation: What the
Courts Do in Fact, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 89, 96 (1985). Empirically, in a study that reviewed
cases regarding the duty of fair representation, it was found that plaintiffs rarely won such
actions against their union. In the opinions published from 1977 to 1983 plaintiffs won in
less than five percent of the cases. Id. Although this could be interpreted as showing that
most cases are simply baseless, in light of the historical and on-going reality of
discrimination within labor unions, I believe these figures may indicate the inefficacy of the
doctrine of fair representation to provide a framework of ensuring equality and participation
within unions.
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all issues placed on the bargaining table are in fact competing with one
another in a situation of finite time, energy, and resources, it is almost
impossible to detect how a bargaining process and its outcome has
disparately affected different workers. Since historically, and still today,
union leadership is dominated by white men, even at times when men do
not necessarily outnumber the women in the group, 8° these problems are
still very real.'
8'
In addition to exclusion of issues from the bargaining table, in many
cases union representatives have been hesitant to represent workers in
discrimination claims and grievances. Thus, workers have turned to
"outside" sources for legal and moral support. 12 In certain cases, union
leaders have even played an active role in discrimination and have
reportedly been active participants in creating hostile working
environments by engaging in harassment.'83
Today, many union organizers are calling to rebuild unions using a
180. Even in unions in which men are outnumbered by women, men tend to control
leadership positions, particularly at the national level. Marion Crain, Between Feminism
and Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex Equality, and Labor Speech, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903,
1944 (1996).
181. For example, even though women are now a dominant part of the workforce, very
few collective agreements include clauses regulating flexible hours or childcare facilities. In
effect, statistics have shown that only approximately 2 percent of the nation's
establishments with ten or more employees sponsor day care centers for their workers.
Carol Ann Diktaban, Employer Supported Child Care as a Mandatory Subject of Collective
Bargaining, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 385, 413 (1991). This is particularly telling when
compared to issues of workers' "individual care," such as sickness, injury and pensions, that
are typically included in collective bargaining agreements. Similarly, collective bargaining
on equal pay for comparable worth, sexual harassment prohibitions, and issues concerning
gay and lesbian workers has been scarce. Crain, supra note 170, at 1945; Marion Crain,
Women, Labor Unions, and Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment: The Untold
Story, 4 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 9, 34 (1995). Even when such benefits are conferred, they are
often a result of external interventions by different social movements. For example, where
domestic partner benefits have been conferred on employees through collective bargaining,
it has usually been under the threat of litigation, initiated by gay and lesbian identity groups
such as Lambda. Steven Briggs, Domestic Partners and Family Benefits: An Emerging
Trend, 45 LAB. L.J. 749, 750-53 (1994). Regarding disabilities, although labor unions have
been strong vocal supporters of the ADA, there have already been cases in which unions
opposed accommodation of disabled workers that interfered with collectively bargained
seniority rights. Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the ADA did not require reassignment of disabled workers in violation of a
bona fide seniority system). For a general discussion on the realtionship between collective
bargaining and the ADA, see Robert A. Dubault, The ADA and the NLRA: Balancing
Individual and Collective Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 1271 (1995); Mary K. O'Melveny, The
Americans with Disabilities Act and Collective Bargaining Agreements: Reasonable
Accommodations or Irreconcilable Conflicts?, 82 KY. L.J. 219 (1993-94).
182. Marion Crain, Women, Labor Unions, and Hostile Work Environment Sexual
Harassment: The Untold Story, 4 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 9, 33 (1995).
183. Id.
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"bottom-up approach" and increasing democracy within unions.184  A
hierarchical model of worker organization provides the strength of a
"united-front" vis-a-vis a united, hierarchical employer, as we shall see in
the next section. At the same time, the rise of employee organizations that
distinguish themselves from "unions" is in part a reaction to the
hierarchical model of the NLRA, and its evident problems - the silencing
and exclusion of the voices and interests of weaker sub-groups, coupled
with pacifying workers' struggles by a rigid separation between
representatives and rank-and-file.
B. The Second Dimension: Horizontal Coercion
Esprit de corps: the common spirit existing in the members of a
group and inspiring enthusiasm, devotion, and strong regard for
the honor of the group."'
1. Relational Work, Soft Skills and Emotional Labor
The move from individuated to more coordinated work,
paradigmatically linked with the move from production to services, or from
mass production to flexible production, has brought an increased emphasis
on what is termed "soft skills" and "emotional labor." Soft skills can be
divided into two sub-categories of skills, namely, interpersonal and
motivational. 86 Although the two sub-categories are many times tightly
connected, and this is part of the conflation in many writings between the
horizontal and internal dimensions, I view the first category, interpersonal
skills, as part of the horizontal dimension, and the second category,
motivational skills, as part of the internal dimension, which will be
discussed in the next section. Interpersonal skills include friendliness,
teamwork, and ability to fit in. 87 They may also involve appropriate affect,
grooming, and attire.'s' These skills are emphasized and evaluated both
during the hiring process and during the course of employment. For
example, before hiring, the use of personality tests, such as the Hogan
Psychological Test, which examines ability to adjust, ambition, sociability,
184. Martha Gruelle, Democracy is Power: Rebuilding Unions from the Bottom Up,
Lecture at Harvard Trade Union Program (Mar. 6, 2000) (advocating more control for rank
and file over their campaign and more local involvement in organizing).
185. Merriam-Webster On-Line Dictionary, at http:llwww.m-w.com.
186. See Philip Moss & Chris Tilly, "Soft" Skills and Race: An Investigation of Black
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likeability, creativity and prudence, is now widespread. 8 9
Emotional Labor relates to interpersonal activities at work. Arlie
Hochschild defines emotional labor as work that "requires one to induce or
suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces
the proper state of mind in others."' 90
When an organization seeks to create demand for a service and
then deliver it, it uses the smile and the soft questioning voice.
Behind this delivery display, the organization's worker is asked
to feel sympathy, trust, and good will. On the other hand, when
the organization seeks to collect money for what it has sold, its
worker may be asked to use a grimace and the raised voice of
command. Behind this collection display the worker is asked to
feel distrust and sometimes positive bad will. In each kind of
display, the problem for the worker becomes how to create and
sustain the appropriate feeling.' 9'
Although Hochschild includes in her definition the production of a
particular emotional state in a customer, client, or co-worker, she focuses
her study on emotional work vis-a-vis clients and customers, and
emphasizes the interaction with the "public" as a criterion in defining
'92emotional work. Yet, in many workplaces, the requirements of
interpersonal interaction are most often present vis-a-vis co-workers,
supervisors and subordinates.
Traditionally, neither emotional labor nor interpersonal skills have
been perceived as coercive work requirements. On the contrary, given
conventional biases of privileging emotional over menial work, these
requirements often seem empowering. Yet, in many cases, this is ironic,
since the codes of emotional task fulfillment may be as rigid as other sorts
of tasks, and as artificially performed, requiring a sharp separation between
"real"/"work" or "screened"I"internal" emotions, between the "personal"
and the "impersonal."' 193 Moreover, with the growing importance of the
concepts of soft skills and emotional labor, new patterns of discrimination
and exclusion are emerging. In fact, it is easier to stereotype with regard to
soft skills than with regard to "hard" skills, that are more formalized or
189. Jody Hoffer Gittell & James Powers, Organizing Work to Support Relational
Coordination, Lecture at Sloan School of Business, MIT (Mar. 14, 2000).
190. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF
HUMAN FEELING 7 (1983).
191. Id. at 137-38.
192. Describing clerical and service occupations, including cashiers, salespeople,
lawyers and social workers. Hochschild's two examples for the production of the emotions
of gratitude and fear are flight attendants, who must enhance customers' status, and bill
collectors, who must deflate customers' status. Id.
193. In the next section, I discuss the dichotomy between personal/impersonal at the
workplace, see infra Section V.C.
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technical, and can be more easily measured, quantified, or certified by a
degree. Soft skills are also more contingent and dependent upon cultural
norms. Because they are so open-ended, they can be used as a pretext for
other things, such as racial discrimination or discrimination against
applicants who are suspected to be people that will want to unionize.194
Studies have shown that employers consistently discriminate against
African-Americans when screening on the basis of soft skills. 95 Similarly,
studies have found that certain types of emotional work are
disproportionately delegated and expected of women in the workplace,
196while other emotions are thought to be better expressed by men.
Discriminatory decisions in such situations are either made by supervisors,
in a traditional hierarchical form, or by peers, as will be discussed in the
following sub-section. These forms of discrimination and disparities are
only beginning to be recognized by courts. As with many issues in liberal
regimes, although the law is often a step behind in addressing problems, the
forefront for bringing legal adjustments to new realities is likely to be
identity-based discrimination claims, which are more receptively heard,
particularly in the United States, than class-based claims for universal
redistribution or justice. 1
97
One example in which the Court has recognized gender discrimination
in the context of soft skills is the Price Waterhouse case, where the
plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, was denied partnership in her accounting firm.198
While she was often praised as an "outstanding professional," and Judge
Gessel stressed that she was described as
[an employee with a] strong character, independence, and
integrity... extremely competent, intelligent, strong, and
forthright, very productive, and creative. Virtually all of the
partners' negative remarks about Hopkins-even those of partners
supporting her-had to do with her "interpersonal skills,"...
[both] [s]upporters and opponents of her candidacy, indicated
that she was sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult
to work with and impatient with staff. There were clear signs,
though, that some of the partners reacted negatively to Hopkins'
personality because she was a woman. One partner described her
194. See Moss & Tilly, supra note 186, at 271 (recommending the development and
support of programs that will teach "code switching to assist inner-city Blacks in bridging
the cultural divide with employers").
195. Id.
196. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 190, at 163.
197. See generally NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTION ON THE
'POSTCOCIALIST' CONDITION (1997) (commenting on the American "post-socialist"
dichotomy between "distribution," which is class-based and "recognition," which is
identity-based).
198. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.CL 1775 (1989).
2001]
168 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 4:1
as "macho"; another suggested she "overcompensated for being a
woman"; a third advised her to take "a course at charm
school."'99
Under these circumstances, the majority opinion of the Supreme Court
held that Hopkins was discriminated against on the basis of gender
stereotyping. While this is an important decision, it is important to
remember that it leaves untouched the legitimacy of interpersonal
requirements in and of themselves, and focuses solely on the discriminatory
effects of such requirements.
2. Manufacturing Interpersonal Skills: The Rise of the "Team
Player"
As technology advances, the workplace is becoming more and more
dispersed, meaning that co-workers can often work at home or in different
offices. However, with the growing importance of relational coordination,
new emphasis is put on coordination and meetings, and this is seen in new
designs of work environments that emphasize conference rooms and
common spaces.200 The "water cooler" has become iconic to informal
meetings where people "get things done.",
20'
In addition to altering the physical environment, many employers
actively shape interpersonal skills by hiring group dynamics consultants,
mandating collective "think sessions," setting up extra-curricular activities,
and by sending their employees to participate in "leadership workshops,"
"'executive retreats," or simply "employee trips." Employee "adventure
training" retreats, for example, are designed to "bind participants to each
other and instill greater unity once they return to the workplace. 20 2
Employees are often required to participate in games such as "trust falls,"
in which "one participant stands on a tree stump with his or her back to
other group members who line up and hold out their arms. The participant
is then told to fall back, and is caught by the others before he or she hits the
,,203204
ground.20 3 The Wagenseller case, in which the plaintiff, a nurse, went
on an eight-day camping and rafting retreat down the Colorado River with
a group consisting largely of hospital co-workers and her immediate
supervisor, illuminates the nature of some retreats.20' During the trip, the
199. Id. at 1782.
200. Bill Mitchell (Dean of School of Architecture, MIT and author of CITY OF BITS AND
E-TOPIA), Lecture at MIT, (April 4, 2000).
201. Id.
202. Joan Vogel, Manufacturing Solidarity: Adventure Training for Managers, 19
HOFSTRA L. REv. 657 (1991).
203. Id. at 660.
204. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985).
205. Id. at 1029. For additional analysis, see Vogel, supra note 202, at 660.
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group engaged in collective urination, bathing, and heavy drinking. They
also prepared a group parody "Moon River," in which all the participants
exposed themselves.20 6 The plaintiff refused to engage in these activities,
although she experienced great pressures from the group to do SO.
207
Although her evaluations before the trip were very good, upon return from
the retreat, her supervisor constantly criticized her work, and eventually she
was fired.203 The supervisor, who believed that participation in the group
activities was a bonding experience among employees, claimed that the
plaintiffs behavior indicated she was not a "team player."209 The case, in
which the plaintiff claimed wrongful discharge, was analyzed in terms of
violation of the state's indecency statutes. The Arizona Supreme Court
held that the discharge would be contrary to public policy if the employee
was fired for refusing to participate in activities that would violate
Arizona's indecent exposure statute.2'0 Although the court did not limit the
scope of public policy to acts violating a specific statute, it based much of
its findings in this case on the fact that a criminal statute, "indecent public
exposure," was involved.2 n
3. "Peer" Pressure in a Participative Environment
In the context of interpersonal relations, participative schemes should
be understood. Employee involvement is advocated by many management
scholars regarding "hierarchical, authoritarian management as being
responsible for the most serious problems facing corporate
organizations. 21 2 Yet, within participatory workplaces, it is important to
notice the continuing existence of the several dimensions of coercive
forces. First, there exist hierarchical forces, which are encoded and
implemented in the participative settings. Using participative schemes,
managers have developed new ways to exercise control over employees
through social or "horizontal" relations, and are still directly involved in
various "intimidation rituals" that coerce employees into submitting to their
will. 213 Second, a "purer" form of horizontal coercion appears when it is
harder (although often times possible) to trace co-worker behavior and
"peer" pressure back to the managerial direction. Finally, participation also
relates to the dimensions of internal coercion and conceptual co-optation,
which will be discussed in the following sections.






212. THOMAS A. POTTERFIELD, THE BUSINESS OF EMPLOYEE EMPOWERMENT 103 (1999).
213. HOGLER & GRENIER, supra note 69, at 109.
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In their study on employee participation, Raymond Hogler and
Guillermo Grenier quote a quality circle developer explaining the
comprehensive use of different anti-union strategies: the "traditional
approach," "pro-active approach" and "individual approach":
We are using the "traditional" management approach [against
unionization] where management gives the workers information
not necessarily solicited by them but nevertheless important in
informing them about the anti-union stance of the company.
Another approach is the "pro-active" approach [used by some
teams]. The facilitator sort of orchestrates and initiates the
discussion of the union at QC meetings and in that way gets
across certain ideas about the union to employees. The third
approach is the "individual conflict" approach where individuals
already known to be pro-union are isolated at the QC level and
individual level. We try to keep them isolated from other QC
members and at the same time confront them individually
concerning the union issue.
214
As we can see, the "traditional approach" is clearly a hierarchical
measure. The "proactive approach" described in the passage is more
complicated. It uses horizontal peer pressure, organized and directed by
managers. The "individual approach" is also a "mixed" measure. It uses
the separation from the group as a method of control. Indeed, the use of
coercive measures together shows the conflicting possible effects of co-
workers, both as control "measures" orchestrated by management, and as
threats, which need to be separated from one another in instances of
resistance.
Supervisors, often called "facilitators," are present during participation
program meetings. The hierarchy is "flattened", but present. Facilitators
stage discussions by "insiders," which bring up, in a seemingly
spontaneous way, topics that are on management's agenda, such as an anti-
union discussion.215 It is interesting to notice that similar to today's social
psychologists who are used as facilitators or organizers of workplace
participation, we have seen how in the Fordist era, industrial engineers and
social workers served to supervise, to instill values, and to pose co-workers
214. The individual approach is further described: "For the psychological campaign to be
effective at the individual level, the "button" or weakness of each pro-union worker had to
be identified, and the "personal touch" in authority soon became the customary method of
controlling the work force." Id. at 112-13.
215. Id. at 113-14. In this context, it is also important to rethink the prohibitions of
employers' coercive speech against unionization. Clearly, the use of co-workers should also
be considered in some way. On employer speech prohibitions, see generally Alan Story,
Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 406-14 (1995) (suggesting that the NLRB underestimates the
coercive power of certain non-threatening employer speech regarding unionization).
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against one another by requiring them to report on each other's
behaviors. 6 Understood in this light, it is not surprising that some
scholars and union leaders refer to participatory schemes in the workplace
today as "Team Taylorism. ,
217
[W]hen a union is not involved [in participation programs]
workers usually end up being manipulated. This might have its
attractions, since usually it means that the company will change
its routine for a while and it will seem as if something will come
out of this change. But in most cases it's all smoke and
mirrors... Especially in these days, when companies are
looking for flexibility, which really means absolute control, you
find that employers will put in some sort of quality circle model
to avoid other models which might require that they really listen
and respond to the people, like a union... Employers create these
things to create an illusion of participation when in reality the
purpose is the opposite: to control and manipulate the workers.
And again, many scholars worry that dividing employees into small
participatory groups fragments their collective voice.2 19 Parker and
Slaughter argue that such "choosing sides" pressures also exist when
participatory schemes are introduced within a unionized setting.220
Employees, first of all, have a sense of belonging to and
identifying with a specific work group. For that reason, they have
little sense of community with all other workers in the plant. The
segmentation into small groups engenders an "us-them" view of
work relations and obscures common interests of workers as
opposed to the interests of managers. The small group allows
management to more closely monitor employee behavior and
216. See infra Section III. For an example of today's facilitators see HOGLER &
GRENER, supra note 69, at 109 (describing the manager in charge of developing a quality
circle program as "a social psychologist from one of the major behavioral science
departments in the country. In one of his candid moments, he confided that he was hired for
three reasons: he was a Chicano, he hated unions, and he was trained in manipulating
people"). It is similarly interesting to observe that Senator Wagner, explaining the need for
the NLRA, talked also about "human engineering" and "the new economics of social
control." Barenberg, supra note 9, at 1415, (citing Robert F. Wagner, Address to the
Conference on Unemployment 5 (Dec. 30, 1930)).
217. Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Cooperation: From
Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 753, 912 (citing Stephen Wood,
The Cooperative Labour Strategy in the US Auto Industry, 7 EcON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY
415 (1986)).
218. HOGLER & GRENIER, supra note 69, at 117 (quoting Richard Bensinger, Director of
the AFL-CIO Organizing Institute) (emphasis added).
219. MIKE PARKER & JANE SLAUGHTER, CHOOSING SIDES: UNIONS AND THE TEAM
CONCEPT 3-6, 48-49 (1988).
220. HOGLER & GRENIER, supra note 69, at 109-110 (citing PARKER & SLAUGHTER supra
note 219).
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attain conformity to the organizational norms. Similarly,
participatory structures encourage workers to confront managers
on an individual basis, thus impeding collective activity on the
part of workers. Conflict is to be resolved by personal interaction
and not through institutional methods such as a negotiated labor
agreement, the supervisor appears to be "one of the workers,"
and the goals of workers and supervisors are perceived as
common and mutually attainable, rather than class-based and
adversariaL
221
In addition to the presence of hierarchy within horizontality, "purer"
forms of horizontal coercion also exist within participation frameworks.
The concept of "self-managed team" typically gives workers direct
responsibility for managing their own time-schedules, task distribution and
discipline. Many forms of employee participation often encourage written
evaluations or open discussion regarding negative emotions toward other
employees.2 22 At times, co-workers can exercise more pressure on each
other than management because of their close relationships and the access
to information about each other's "soft spots" and vulnerabilities.
Everything becomes more "personal" and boundaries between friend and
foe are blurred.
The coercive effects of the group may begin during the hiring process
and may continue until the termination of employment. Hogler and
Grenier describe the roles of quality circles in the hiring processes in a
Johnson & Johnson plant during the 1980's.
[T]he effects of QC [quality circle] on the work force began even
before an applicant was officially hired. Each potential employee
was first interviewed by a member of the personnel department
and, if she survived the initial interview, was referred to the plant
manager or a department supervisor for another interview. The
final stage in this process was an interview by two QC members
or future "peers" from the Circle to which the applicant would be
assigned. Those two workers had the authority to hire or to veto
the hiring of the applicant. Consequently, the new employee
realized during the hiring process that she was dependent upon
her fellow QC members for her job; and after an employee was
hired, the QC program continued to function as the primary
structure socializing the employee into the normative patterns of
the plant work culture.223
In addition to their universal effects, here again, a close look at
221. HOGLER & GRENIER, supra note 69, at 109 (emphasis added).
222. Id.; see also GUILLERMO J. GRENIER, INHUMAN RELATIONS: QUALITY CIRCLES AND
ANTI-UNIONISM IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 46-48 (1988).
223. HOGLER & GRENIER, supra note 69, at 112.
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participative dynamics reveals that they may entail patterns of
discrimination and exclusion. These patterns are more subtle, interactive,
and structural, and not easily configured into preexisting constructions of
anti-discrimination laws.224  According to some studies, women have
greater difficulties assimilating in the participation process. 225 Recently, a
group of African-American employees filed a suit against their employer in
reaction to the creation and actions of self-managed teams at the
company. 226 However, discrimination laws reflect the traditional images of
hierarchical coercion, in which there is an individual who has the power to
decide to discriminate against a subordinate. 227 In self-managed teams that
decide their own directions, it is much more difficult to point out who
decided and how a discriminatory decision was made. Therefore,
understanding the dynamics of decision-making within a group of peers is
crucial to rethinking the laws to accommodate these challenges. 228
One of the areas in which such inquiries have begun to take place is
that of peer sexual harassment. While sexual harassment cases are
continuously informed by hierarchical motivations (such as the sexual
desires of a supervisor) rather than peer competition, they have also
recognized to some extent the presence of horizontal harassment relations.
Building on this recognition, Vicki Shultz argues that it is important to
adopt explicitly an "in-out" approach and reject the "top-down" approach
to sexual harassment. This is because one must understand sexual
harassment as a mechanism for exclusion by co-workers, with the purpose,
not of gaining sexual favors, but of excluding women's participation and
229inhibiting their advancement. Cases like Price Waterhouse, Wagenseller
and Johnson Wax also illuminate the need for more sensitivity toward
interpersonal work requirements, intra-group "horizontal" dynamics, and
224. Susan Sturm, Race, Gender, and the Law in the Twenty-first Century Workplace:
Some Preliminary Observations, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 639, 642 (1998).
225. PAUL BATE & IAIN MANGHAM, EXPLORING PARTICIPATION 205 (1981) (observing in
their case study that "[t]his could be because it is male-dominated, but we also feel that the
women have shown greater timidity in bringing issues forward, and have had greater
difficulty freeing themselves from the 'moaning and groaning script'). Rather than
exploring the complex coercive dynamics of a genderized society, this kind of statement
invokes an essentialist stereotype that women are less inclined to receive power, to
participate in decisionmaking and that they prefer in some way to be in a hierarchical
situation.
226. Polland, supra note 125.
227. Sturm, supra note 224, at 643.
228. Id. (citing Susan Jackson, Team Composition in Organizations, in GROUP PROCESS
AND PRODUCTIVITY (S. Worchel et al. eds., 1992)).
229. The 35th Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review Conference: Constitutional
Lawyering in the 21st Century, March 4th 2000. For a description of sexual harassment as a
disciplinary mechanism by co-workers against resistance to socially prescribed gender roles,
see also DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DREssING ETC., 147-62 (1993).
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the different functions of pressure at work. While discrimination and
harassment claims are helpful in assessing such requirements, they should
not be the end of every inquiry. There is always (and always has been) a
need to assess the legitimacy of work relations and the requirements that
are imposed upon individuals and groups in the workplace by others and by
themselves. There are many areas in which the laws have developed in
detail, including discrimination, harassment, and, to a lesser extent,
privacy. Yet, there are still many blind spots in work relations, and this
inquiry is aimed at illuminating where and how these could be found.
4. Employee Caucuses and Identity Groups
Participatory schemes can be described as a collapse of both
hierarchical work patterns and hierarchical worker organizations.
Employee participation programs are institutions of "employee voice" that
are set up to serve management needs, but may also take on a life of their
own, becoming a forum to express dissatisfaction. Therefore, they are
often perceived by their members as an alternative to unionization. This is
the on-going tension that can be read in the literature dealing with
participation models. When participation programs are set up by
management, it is difficult to view them as a "mode of resistance," which
"mirrors" (rather than is) a pattern of work organization. It is interesting,
however, to notice that within workplace settings that can be characterized
as the "new workplace models," there have also emerged relatively
autonomous constructions of employee organizations.
"Employee caucuses" have become widespread, especially in the
high-tech industry, formed by active employees in a certain workplace with
the goal of influencing their working conditions without forming a formal
union.230 For example, in TekCo, an encouragement by management to use
an electronic bulletin board to express employee dissatisfaction led to the
formation of employee groups and collective resistance to the company's
policies.2 3' Employee caucuses are portrayed as having an emphasis
different from unions. These caucuses tend to be:
decentralized and participative, minimizing the role of
bureaucratic structure. Rather than placing demands on the
employer, [an informal employee association] emphasizes
services to the membership ranging from insurance plans to
intellectual networking to "consciousness-raising." And when
230. Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging System of
Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 157-58, 166 (1993) (arguing that although
currently such groups are not unions and their legal status is unclear, labor law should
protect such employee caucuses as a fundamental institution of employee voice).
231. Id.
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pressing collective interests, it usually makes use of publicity
rather than such direct action as a strike.3 2
"Identity caucuses," again, are non-union employee groups that have
formed in recent years at many workplaces around issues of identity and
discrimination.
The first identity caucus, BABE (Bay Area Black Employees) was
founded by African-American sales representatives at the Xerox
Corporation in 1969 in reaction to receiving inferior sales territories. 21'
Since then, many other identity groups have formed in various workplaces,
representing workers with shared "identities" (but not "class"), including
women's groups, ethnic and national groups, and gay and lesbian groups. 
34
They may be said to mirror "employee diversity committees," which have
been set up by management in many non-unionized companies as a
response to complaints by minority employees.
235
Employee and identity caucuses reflect the movement away from
hierarchy and the strict separation between labor and management that
were the elements of the NLRA model. They can also be understood as a
reaction to the traditional authoritarian and exclusionary practices of the
labor movement. Finally, they may also reflect a strategic move. When a
company is explicitly hostile to labor unions, employees have found other
ways to advance their rights. In the case of identity caucuses, the strategic
advantage is even broader. In an anti-union, anti-redistribution regime,
along with the relative receptiveness of anti-discrimination and
"recognition" claims on behalf of identity social movements, worker
organizations that frame their claims around identity issues may well be
more successful than those who frame universal demands.236
232. HECKSCHER, supra note 78, at 66.
233. Hyde, supra note 230, at 172-73. BABE convinced management to increase the
number of black employees at Xerox by assigning one black interviewer to each black
candidate and by personal recruitment by BABE members. BABE's goals widened when
the group filed a suit against Xerox, claiming that black sales representatives were assigned
inferior sales territories. The suit was settled, local management was replaced, new
territories were assigned, and Xerox even provided some compensation to equalize past
earnings.
234. For example, 9to5, the Working Women's Association, addresses the needs of
women office workers to enhance their ability to assert and enforce their rights. Although it
is allied with the labor movement, it remains an independent organization. Crain, supra
note 173, at 72; Rachel Geman, Safeguarding Employee Rights in Post-Union World: A
New Conception of Employee Communities, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 369, 379-80
(1997) (citing Ann Scales, Black AT&T Workers to Urge Diversity Plan, Dallas Morning
News, Sept. 23, 1993, at 2D).
235. On "employee diversity committees," see Note, Labor-Management Cooperation
After Electromation: Implications for Workplace Diversity, 107 HARV. L. REv. 678, 683-84
(1994).
236. E.g., FRASER, supra note 197; Kelman, supra note 64, at 993.
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C. The Third Dimension: Internal Coercion
1. Faceless Authority and Corporate Cultures
In its March 2000 issue entitled "The Liberated, Exploited, Pampered,
Frazzled, Uneasy New American Worker," the New York Times Magazine
notes:
Authority has not exactly vanished from corporate America, but
it isn't what it once was. The boom has turned employers into
buyers in a seller's market and it is tough to sell discipline and
order to a newly empowered population imbued with the free-
agent spirit. Anyone who doubts just how vulnerable the boss
now is need only visit the Web site[s] [where employees
exchange information about supervisors].... It's hard to think
of a form of authority that has gone unchallenged in this boom,
237other than the faceless authority of huge piles of money.
There are many ways in which authority can be embedded in social
and organizational structures other than direct "external" commands.
Indeed, the most insidious use of coercive power is shaping values and
perceptions so that workers accept their role in the existing order,
preventing questions, resistance, and conflicts from arising in the first
place.238 One of the greatest mysteries with which social theorists have
struggled is how and why people "obey" something that is not "there;" how
organizational discourse and structures function to exclude certain
meanings and to legitimate others, creating a range of shared meanings,
which are biased in favor of employers.
Many writings have been dedicated to the formation of corporate
cultures (or "ethos"), often linking these questions to inquiries concerning
the shifts between perceptions of economic enterprises as fiction and as
"real," as networks of contracts or as organic entities.4 In fact, many
237. THE N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 5, 2000, at 48 (emphasis added).
238. STEVEN LuKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 23 (1974).
239. Foucault has studied these issues extensively and I return to his studies of power in
different sections of the paper. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWERIKNOWLEDGE:
SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-77 (1980). Gramsci's writings on
hegemony also illuminate how discipline can be constructed, not only through "external
power," but through language and dialogue as well. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, PRISON
NOTEBOOKS (1992); see also, DENNIS K. MUMBY, COMMUNICATION AND POWER IN
ORGANIZATIONS: DISCOURSE, IDEOLOGY, AND DOMINATION 92-93 (1988); DAVID RIESMAN,
THE LONELY CROWD: A STUDY OF THE CHANGING AMERICAN CHARACTER (1950); CHARLES
F. SABEL, WORK AND POLITICS (1982).
240. A popular manifestation of the idea of corporate culture is WILLIAM OUCHI, THEORY
Z: How AMERICAN BUSINESS CAN MEET THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE (1981). The Japanese
model was to Ouchi a place where employee involvement brought high-commitment,
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corporate cultures are described as double-sided. There is the "external
culture," which reflects how the corporation portrays itself to the "world,"
the consumers, the public, the market and an "internal culture," the life
inside the firm.241
In the "inside world," certain attitudes and values can be understood to
be the "right" ones to hold, and certain beliefs are likely to be shared. One
attempt to articulate the faceless values of enterprises is that of Gerald Frug
in his article, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, in which
Frug explains how bureaucratic power is legitimated by creating an image
of a structure that restrains human domination through constraints on those
who wield power within it.242  Frug argues that the characteristics of
bureaucratic ideology serve as "mechanisms of deception," leading us
deceptively to believe that bureaucracy allows for human freedom and
autonomy, or in our terms, human agency, when in fact it serves as a
coercive system with narrow possibilities.243  This is made possible by
maintaining two coexisting ideologies within the bureaucracy. First,
bureaucratic organizations are defended on the basis that their power is
constrained by "objectivity" and "neutrality." 244  Second, within this
"objective structure," there is also a notion of its antithesis, subjectivity, in
which the bureaucracy allows for the presence of personal self-expression
and individuality. 245
At this stage of our inquiry, using the context of Frug's
objective/subjective dialectic, it is important to emphasize that the
questions of internal coercion should be complicated in several ways. First,
when we understand preferences not as fixed, but as dynamic, how can we
differentiate between benign development of preferences and coercive
influence? In this sense, the interplay between subjective/objective,
values, consensus and creativity to the firms. See generally John Dewey, The Historic
Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926) (addressing entity or
personality theories of the corporation); Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive
History of Organizational "Real Entity" Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575 (1989) (same);
Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American
Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987) (dealing with the notion of corporate culture); Michael
J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1061 (1994) (same).
241. See, e.g., Jody Hoffer Gittell & James Powers, Organizing Work to Support
Relational Coordination, Lecture at Sloan School of Business, MIT (Mar. 14, 2000).
242. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1276, 1286-87 (1984); see generally MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND
ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986) (discussing the the
question of bureaucracy and how it was created); ALVIN W. GOULDNER, PATTERNS OF
INDUSTRIAL BUREAUCRACY (1935) (same).
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personal/impersonal challenges the possibility of "subjectivity," and
perhaps even of "agency." Thus, "'[s]ubjectivity' becomes just as much of
a construct as 'objectivity,' so that we could use the same tools to show that
it is impossible for law and science to be 'subjective' as we had just used to
show that they could not be 'objective.' ' ,246 Moreover, without a more
substantive idea of "good" worklife, it is difficult to draw the lines between
coercion and preference reconstruction, and between legitimate and
illegitimate influence.247
Second, what are the values, requirements, and expectations to which
internal coercion mechanisms are geared? There is a wide spectrum of
"commands" or "expectations" present in a workplace. The most obvious
are concrete norms that are explicitly stated, either as a general matter,
through detailed codes of conduct of a firm, or in ad hoc situations, for
example, demanding obedience to a supervisor's or a team's resolution.
The more difficult situations to explain are when a company expects
something more than mere obedience. The compliance with such
expectation may seem vague, and it is difficult to trace where the
expectation was generated. Indeed, often such expectation may even be in
contradiction with a firm's formal work conditions. A vivid example, and
one close to home, is that of law firm culture. While many law firms
formally offer reduced hour arrangements and flexible parental leave
policies, these have little effect on the lives of the lawyers employed by the
firm, since the cultural underpinning of law firms, the "culture of success,"
prevents lawyers from utilizing these formal arrangements. Thus, if in the
previous section, we saw the demands for 'forced intimacy," here we must
recognize the existence of demands for 'forced spontaneity/creativity."
Hence, as promised, this section completes the second side of "soft
skills," motivational skills, including enthusiasm, creativity, positive work
attitude, morale, commitment, dependability, and willingness to learn. 24s
Again, these requirements have become increasingly important in new
patterns of work. Michael Piore describes how new forms of organizing
work and job descriptions contribute to more creativity and independent
thought of employees in comparison to the "old" narrowly tailored tasks:
"[t]he notion of creativity is alien to a conception of thought in which the
range of possible ideas is anticipated in advance and encoded in memorized
routines or in abstract principles that are evoked by cues from the external
246. Boyle, supra note 1, at 497.
247. In fact, this question is very close to the debate concerning the concept of
("true/false") "paternalism." Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1736-37 (1976); Frances Olsen, From False
Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on Feminist Community, Illinois 1869-
1895, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1518, 1520-22 (1986).
248. Moss & Tilly, supra note 186, at 256.
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environment.1
249
Katherine Stone has also recently described the new requirements of
workplaces, pointing to a paradox in these new employment relationships.
On the one hand, job security and promotions are no longer implicitly
promised in the relationship, yet, on the other hand, employers aim to build
a "high-commitment workforce," in which employees are expected to be
highly motivated and dedicated to their jobs.' 0
A third commentator, Charles Heckscher, contrasts the expectations
from workers in the old Taylorist hierarchical workplaces (which he refers
to as bureaucracies in the following passage) with new participatory
workplaces, based on the managerial theory:
[B]ureaucracy is driven by the need for stability, managerialism,
by the need for flexibility. From employees, bureaucracy
requires obedience, and, if possible, loyalty; managerialism
requires creativity and commitment. Finally, the organization
principle of bureaucracy is command; of managerialism,
coordination of diverse and autonomous units. If innovation can
come from any part of the system, the problem is to get all the
pieces working in the same general direction. 15
When describing the movement from "old" requirements to new
expectations, writers often fall into a dialectic of a shift from the old
Taylorist discipline and obedience (bad) to the drive and motivation of new















249. PiORE, supra note 7, at 119.
250. Stone, supra note 85; Richard E. Walton, From Control to Commitment in the
lVorkplace, 76 HARv. Bus. REv. 76,79-80 (1985).
251. HECKSCHER, supra note 78, at 101 (emphasis added).
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Yet, as we have seen in the horizontal dimension, and as will further
be described in this section, "newer" requirements are often not very
different from the "old" ones, and both are often manufactured and tightly
controlled by the employer.
2. Internal Control Mechanisms and Their Relation to the Former
Dimensions
Workplaces generate values and internal coercion mechanisms in
many different ways. We have already mentioned the role of structuring
the workplace as personal and impersonal at the same time. Many
employers make demands on employees that are considered very
"personal." Fordist environments included supervision regarding church
attendance, personal savings, and even whether workers make their beds
every morning.52 Workplaces also make demands regarding dress codes,
extracurricular activities and social interactions. Even when such
requirements are not made explicitly, employers and more veteran co-
workers can signal their approval of certain attire and behavior by setting
their own standards, rewarding certain employees and disapproving of
others. At the same time, workplaces, often with the help of legal
regulation, exclude the "personal" and set sharp boundaries between the
objective/subjective, impersonal/personal, work/play, market/family, by
prohibiting, for example, romantic relations between co-workers, personal
arrangements during work hours, and the use of knowledge and skills
gained from work outside of the workplace. Setting the boundaries of time
and space are important elements of internal controls. In recent years,
many firms have implemented open spaces, see-through cubicles, e-mail
monitoring systems, drug-testing, strict time-table requirements, and
reports of tasks in very short intervals.
Other pro-active mechanisms include the use of educational and
training programs.5 3 In addition to promoting group unity as we saw in the
former section in Wagenseller, outdoor adventure retreats are designed to
develop employee identification with the corporation's goals.54 Activities
and classes are supposed to help employees "face their fears," increase
their creativity, and learn to deal with anxiety and stress through
accomplishing physical goals, such as overcoming fear of heights or white
water rafting5 5  "[L]ike military basic training, these programs are
designed to 'remake' executives in the image of the organization and to
252. CONOT, supra note 91, at 176.
253. COTTON, supra note 119, at 36-38.
254. Vogel, supra note 202, at 658.
255. Id.
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erase individual differences.
' 256
Clearly, there is often also a close relationship between horizontal
settings and internal coercion. The implementation of "cultural coercion"
is facilitated by the coercive mechanism of the "social." The new lean,
"no-slacking," "total quality" organizations that have looked at the
Japanese workplace as a model have not only implemented the idea of
"management by participation," but also the idea of "management by
stress."' 7 Moreover, many firms that have looked at the corporate culture
concept coming from Japan have found that employee participation
programs that have been implemented in their own firms have been
developing the same principles of the corporate culture movement2 8 In
subtle ways, managers use the teams to influence employees to understand
the work environment from management's perspective. 259 The culture of
participation creates an atmosphere in which rules and regulations are
"informal" and are not directly associated with management, but seen as "a
natural outcome of the social relations of production. '26 In light of such
practices, managerial theorists believe that participation serves the function
of "breed[ing] identification with the values and goals of the firm."261
Finally, the renaming phenomenon in the context of work is similarly
an important piece of our puzzle. In recent years, many firms have
changed job titles, from "secretaries" to "assistants," from any title to
"associates," and sometimes even to "partners." The renaming effect is
closely related to the "disappearance" of the "blue-collar worker" and of
the "working class." Today, all are "white-collar" and "middle-class.'- 62
Exploring the current fracture between social-democratic parties and mass-
production working-class, Roberto Unger notes:
They find this traditional constituency to be a shrinking part of
the population, stuck in a declining sector of the economy, and
perceived by others and ultimately by itself as just one more
faction, with factional interests, rather than as the bearer of
universal popular interests. When the labor and progressive
parties sever their favored links with these working-class
organizations, they often believe themselves to have no
alternative but to turn to the generic "quality-of-life" concerns of
the professional-business class. Although this class may
256. Id.
257. PARKER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 219, at 16-29.
258. HECKSCHER, supra note 78, at 88.
259. HOGLER & GRENIER, supra note 69, at 109.
260. Id. at 108.
261. James R. Lincoln & Arne L. Kalleberg, Commitment, Quits and Work Organization
in Japanese and U.S. Plants, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 39, 56 (1996).
262. ROBERTO UNGER & CORNELL WEST, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN PROGRESSIVISM 14-
16 (1998) (commenting on the disappearance of the "working class" in America).
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represent but a small portion of the population, it is a portion
enjoying cultural ascendancy, especially over the vast masses of
propertyless and powerless white collar workers, in services,
shops, and offices, who imagine themselves member of a "middle
class" to which all but the richest and poorest belong.263
3. Passive Resistance
By pushing to its ultimate consequences the disciplinary power of
the panoptic built by modem science, Foucault demonstrates that
in this "regime of truth," there is no emancipatory way out, since
resistance itself becomes a disciplinary64 power, hence a
consented, because internalized, oppression.
The existential dilemma of "no exit" is most strongly understood
within the context of internal coercion. How can workers resist faceless
authority or values that they have learned to passively accept as part of
their culture? How is dissatisfaction expressed against a system rather than
a person? Legislative efforts to regulate the coercive use of this dimension
are often limited by the difficulties of defining coercion and rendering it
visible in this context. As Foucault has characterized, disciplinary power in
various social institutions has no center; it is pervasive throughout the
institutions; it is generated from the bottom up, making its own targets the
agents of its diffusion.265
Resistance to such forms of power is consequently difficult to
mobilize or even to detect. Indeed, today, dissatisfaction of workers is
expressed more passively than in the past. From sabotage to mere shirking,
resistance to internal coercive devices becomes more subtle and atomized.
The Dilbert comic-strip series represents the alienation of "white-collar"
workers facing the absurdities of large bureaucracies and taking a micro-
resistance, petty-corruption "survivalist" route, unable, as Unger implies, to
imagine themselves as a collective class that could organize to improve
their lives. Thus, the problem of a "commitment gap" is most widespread, ,,266
today and is apparent in many "high-discretion" job-holders. Rather than
263. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 143-144
(1996).
264. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Oppositional Postmodernism and Globalizations, 23
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 121, 126 (1998) (emphasis added); see also DUNCAN KENNEDY.
CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 271 ("Foucault is right that power, including power exercised
through law, has meaning only to the extent that there is resistance and gets its practical
content from resistance as well as from 'above."').
265. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON (1977) (discussing disciplinary power in various social institutions).
266. HECKSCHER, supra note 78, at 5 (citing DANIEL YANKELOVICH & JOHN IMMERWAHR,
PUTTING THE WORK ETHIC TO WORK: A PUBLIC AGENDA REPORT ON RESORTING AMERICA'S
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active protest, employees tend to express their dissatisfaction by
diminishing their commitment and effort at work.267
D. The Fourth Dimension: Conceptual Co-optation
The fourth dimension is the over-arching "meta' category of co-
optation. While the third dimension, internal coercion, described "micro"-
work patterns of pacifying workers, this dimension discusses the "macro"-
phenomenon of deradicalizing an idea. Moreover, while the third
dimension took a more static view of the single workplace, this dimension
takes a comparative view, contrasting between the theoretical, often
academic, ideal of reform, and how it plays out in practice. The two
dimensions are, however, clearly connected. Thus, many phenomena that
were discussed in the former section, such as the importance of "naming,"
reappear here. In fact, this dimension relates to much of what has been
explored throughout this paper and, in a sense, can be seen as a partial
summary and integration of former ideas. It will, therefore, be described
relatively briefly.
A helpful distinction, which relates to the distinction between the
dimensions put forth above, is that of the two senses in which concepts and
forms of worker organization can be co-optive. First, many writers have
explored how unionization and participation may co-opt (or "bust") one
268another, and I have discussed these concerns in former sections. Marc
Barenberg describes the different ways in which this type of co-optation
has been described in relation to participation:
The proposition, in the argot of economists and cognitive
psychologists, is that capital suppliers' managerial agents, acting
either in the distributive interests of their principals or in their
independent interest in managerial control, use their bargaining
power to generate "endogenous" changes in the "preferences" or
"perceptual frame" of weaker contracting parties. Stated in the
terminology of critical theory, employers exercise domination
over workers through "hegemonic" transformations in worker
consciousness or ideology, either as an alternative or a
supplement to coercive forms of control. In lay terms,
cooperative schemes "co-opt" workers. That is, such schemes do
deflect workers' group choice over workplace governance
modes, and in a systematic direction-away from the full
collective bargaining that the New Deal policy equates with
COMPETITIVE VITALITY 2-3 (1983)).
267. HECKSCHER, supra note 78, at 5.
268. Discussion supra Section II.
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objective "industrial democracy. 269
Again, this form of co-optation has been discussed in the earlier
sections, particularly with regard to the use of social "peer" pressure and
corporate values that lead workers to believe that unionization belongs to
different times and types of workers, not to them-that they are already
organized or part of the "system." Yet, in this section, I am interested in
describing a second co-optation effect, that of the stripping down of the
institutions of collective bargaining and employee participation from their
own ideal. That is, the tension between the theory and the action, when
facing a partial realization of an imagined reform.
1. The Judicial Deradicalization of Collective Bargaining
At the outset of his path-breaking paper, Karl Klare mentions a puzzle
regarding the enactment of the NLRA: "[I]t appears that a small number of
the most sophisticated representatives of business favored passage of the
Act on the theory that some such measure was essential to preserve the
social order and to forestall developments toward even more radical
change." 270
The puzzle is solved when Klare proceeds to explore the judicial
deradicalization of collective bargaining. Klare argues that the New Deal
reform has eventually fostered the co-optation of the labor movement and
the diminution of labor's combativeness. 271 In its most critical version,
Klare explains, the claim is that "collective bargaining has become an
institutional structure not for expressing workers' needs and aspirations but
for controlling and disciplining the labor force and rationalizing the labor
market. 272  Klare demonstrates how certain interpretations of the Act,
seemingly neutral or even favorable, actually reflected certain unarticulated
images rather than necessary outcomes: contractualism surmounted
participation, representation surpassed grass-roots activities, and "neutral"
public/private dichotomies overrode the New Deal social-communal
moment.
Thus, the courts understood the NRLA as implying individualism and
self-interest by replicating the classical model of contractualism, and by
perceiving the merits of collective action as merely a way to equalize
273bargaining power. Therefore, rather than interpreting the NRLA as a
framework for the advancement of worker participation in ownership and
269. Barenberg, supra note 122, at 762.
270. Klare, supra note 9, at 266.
271. Id. at267.
272. Id. (citing STANLEY ARONOWITz, FALSE PROMISES: THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN
WORKING CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 306 (1973)).
273. Id. at 265.
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management, collective bargaining was limited to be simply a means of
remedying unequal bargaining power by numerical aggregation of its
members and strict representation by leadership. Moreover, the courts
often continued to base their decisions on the notion that labor and
management are more or less equivalent in their power, but extremely
divergent in their interests and goals.274 Thus, the NLRA, as it has been
interpreted by the courts, limited the scope of the bargaining unit (for
example, rigidly excluding "managerial employees"), limited the
possibilities of participation, limited the forms of labor activity, excluding
"secondary boycott," and limited the scope of labor speech, excluding from
it "political speech." 275
2. The Practical Deradicalization of Employee Participation
[Participative management] doesn't mean you delegate all your
responsibilities to those below you, and it doesn't mean you start
taking a vote on everything. Nor does it change the structure or
hierarchy of your organization. Participative management is
simply a style of operating in which you give your peers and
subordinates an opportunity to say what they think, and you
include their ideas in the overall decision-making process. 76
While in its ideal, workplace participation has been advocated by pro-
labor scholars and activists. In practice, employers have demonstrated that
they can implement participatory schemes while keeping the larger
framework of the traditional labor-management power relationship
277essentially unchanged. For several decades, in the face of union decline,
274. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90
YALE L. J. 1509, 1511 (1981) (arguing that industrial pluralism was "based on a false
assumption: the assumption that management and labor have equal power in the
workplace").
275. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2001); NLRB v. Peter
Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1942); Cynthia L. Estlund,
What Do Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public Interests, and Freedom of Expression
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 925 (1992); Richard
Michael Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected Protest Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 790-92 (1989); Alan Hyde,
Economic Labor Law v. Political Labor Relations: Dilemmas for Liberal Legalism, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 12 (1981) (American labor law assumes that "employees have joint economic
interests but no joint political interests"); Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L.
REV. 1417, 1427 (1984) ("Labor solidarity is more than an updated version of the social
contract through which each individual undertakes to assist others for the advancement of
his or her own interest.")
276. JOHN R. PHILLIPS, THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COLLECTIVE PROGRAMS 17
(1994) (citing DONALD E. PETERSEN & JOHN HILLKIRK, A BETTER IDEA: REDEFINING THE
WAY AMERICANS WORK 13 (1991)).
277. THOMAS A. PoTrERFiELD, THE BUsINESs OF EMPLOYEE EMPOWERMENT 105 (1999).
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labor scholars have been engaged in imagining new forms of labor
organization, and have looked at the new participation schemes adopted by
businesses, fantasizing that these were the new forms of workplace
empowerment. Yet, as they looked closer, they began to realize that often,
"[m]anagement can limit worker participation to the unimportant aspects of
plant operations, in which no genuine power is surrendered." 278 In practice,
many participatory schemes only allow for a consultative role for
employees, without granting any actual power to decide. In the vast
majority of cases, participatory programs concern operational involvement
in day-to-day problems regarding issues that mainly benefit employers,
such as quality of production and work processes, rather than strategic
policymaking, regarding the direction of the company and the future of
workers.
Facing this reality, labor scholars have begun to feel that they have
been "tricked," describing the practical implementation of the participatory
ideal as "one of the last tricks of capitalism." 279 Thus, in reaction to the
story that has unveiled itself, scholars who have advocated workplace
participation are beginning to rethink, or at least rephrase, their
conceptions. Early on, Paul Bernstein warned that the term "participation
tends toward vagueness and is subject to a host of interpretations," and
therefore suggested using instead the term "workplace democratization."280
Frank Lindenfeld and Joyce Rothschild-Whitt have stressed the distinction
between "limited participation," strictly controlled and limited by
management, and "economic democracy," which is a "genuine" form of
participation.28' Katherine Stone has distinguished between "participation,"
which allows "true" empowerment of labor, and "cooperation," which is a
management-oriented project and disserves labor.282 Stone thus asserted
that the two terms, "cooperation" and "participation," "must be kept
distinct., 283 Finally, many scholars now argue that the concepts of ("low")
operational participation, at the shop-floor level and ("high") strategic
participation, at the upper-management levels, are distinct concepts
properly considered separately. 4
278. HOGLER & GRENIER, supra note 69, at 109.
279. Katherine Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and
Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 169 (1988) (citing Teubner, Industrial
Democracy Through Law: Social Functions of Law in Industrial Innovations, in CONTRACT
AND ORGANIZATION: LEGAL ANALYSIS IN THE LIGHT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY 261,
268 (1986)).
280. PAUL BERNSTEIN, WORKPLACE DEMOCRATIZATION: ITS INTERNAL DYNAMICS 3
(1976).
281. FRANK LINDENFELD & JOYCE ROTHSCHILD-WHITT, WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY AND
SOCIAL CHANGE 4-6 (1982).
282. Stone, supra note 279, at 168-72.
283. Id. at 162.
284. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 29; Barenberg, supra note 122.
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3. Rethinking the Problem of Co-optation
Describing the co-optation dimension sometimes takes an uneasy path.
It looks at something that has been perceived as improving workers'
situations, and declares, "the king has no clothes," or more gently, "this is
not good enough." In the alternative, it finds ulterior motives in real
improvements of working conditions, such as the motives of preventing
organization and surrendering power. Thus, deradicalization arguments are
difficult to make, and even more difficult for others to receive, without
distorting the argument itself. Many times, or perhaps most of the time, the
argument does not attempt to deny the benefits of what has been achieved
but to illuminate what has not (yet) been imagined, linking the reasons for
the latter with the existence of the former. It does not mean that having
nothing is better than having a limited form of collective bargaining or a
limited form of participation. It does mean, however, that having a limited
form of collective bargaining or participation is incomplete, and there are
yet paths for improvement and goals to achieve.
Equally important, exploring the fourth dimension exposes the
problems of thinking about rhetoric and concepts as belonging to one side
of a political debate. Then, when "the other side" embraces the language,
there is a sense of loss of control over an ideal. This illuminates the need,
in any effort for social reform, to always contextualize the discourse and to
avoid evasive, open-ended slogans.
VI. ADVERSARIAL VERSUS COOPERATIVE - MAINTAINING AGENCY
THROUGH A CONSTRUCTIVE TENSION
The more bureaucratic and confrontational the employer, the
more the organizations of employees will fall into adversarial and
centralized patterns. When they are treated as an inferior mass,
white collar workers are quite capable of showing militancy,
striking and picketing in traditional fashion. It is nevertheless
true that, given the chance, they will gravitate toward more
associational types of action.8
Are labor-management relations adversarial or cooperative? Linear
descriptions of old/new work relations suggest that within hierarchical
settings they are adversarial and within horizontal settings they are
collaborative. They further suggest that adversary and hierarchy are
aligned with coercion; while cooperation and horizontality are aligned with
agency. Yet, a multi-dimensional understanding of coercion challenges
these conventional alignments and illuminates the complexities of power in
285. HEcKSCHER, supra note 78, at 67.
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the workplace.
Adhering to traditional images of adversary and hierarchical coercion
conceals many "old" and "new" forms of coercion that are still pervasive in
current patterns of employment relationships. We have seen how in both
"old" and "new" workplaces several dimensions of coercion may exist.
Indeed, we have seen that in the paradigm of "paternalism," the Fordist
model, all coercive dimensions were present in a high degree. Moreover,
we have explored how hierarchical power can be embedded in horizontal
forces, and vice versa, and how a single institution, such as a "self-
managed team," can simultaneously be an empowering and a suffocating
experience. In this sense, both collective bargaining and employee
participation have similarly functioned to serve, in many ways, both labor
and capital needs.
Unless there is a complete identity between ownership, management,
and workers, there are always conflicts of interests between the constituents
of an economic enterprise. These tensions may be enhanced or mitigated,
overt or covert, but in any case continue to exist. As are most human
relationships, labor-management-ownership relations are both adversarial
and cooperative. In sociology, the tension has been termed "antagonistic
cooperation":
Antagonistic cooperation. A relationship between or among
persons in which they join their efforts to produce something of
value to the participants, while at the same time being in conflict
over other things, most particularly the division among
themselves of the product of their joint efforts. The term has
some currency in sociology. It has, oddly enough, almost none in
economics, even though the normal alliance of factors of
production in modem economic aggregates, e.g., between labor
and capital in a corporation, marvelously exemplifies the term
and concept. Indeed, in a somewhat less obvious sense, normal
economic trading also exhibits antagonistic cooperation, in that
parties to a trade can both increase their utilities by exchange, but
still contend over the ratio between the traded goods, i.e., over
286the price.
This is an irresolvable tension, but it is also a clearly patterned and
unequal tension: throughout prosperity and crisis, old and new economies,
it is the worker who is more vulnerable to the tension and who has less
power in shaping its shifting points of balance. Because of this, it is
essential to visibly maintain both aspects of the tension, and to understand
the tension itself as a potential space for action, agency, resistance, and
change.
286. Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855,
2031 (1985).
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Within this tension, it is also important to realize that both "labor" and
"capital" are not singular entities. Rather than a monolithic image of labor-
management relations, throughout the paper, I have accepted a pluralist
framework of labor relations, understanding organizations as
"[f]ractured.. .with incompletely overlapping memberships, widely
differing power bases and a multitude of techniques for exercising
influence on decisions salient to them."287
Co-workers, whether in participatory settings or organizing in a
representative hierarchical structure, have both empowered one another and
have excluded weak groups of workers among them. In turn, marginalized
workers have at times been able to overcome discrimination by co-workers
by turning directly ("bypassing" the union) to employers. Employers, too,
are in competition among themselves. At times, for example, when facing
strong competition with foreign enterprises, employers seek to strengthen
their cooperation with workers. Moreover, there is no simple trade-off
between cooperation between workers and management and cooperation of
workers among themselves. Worker organization, both the collective
bargaining typology and employee participation, in fact contributes to more
cooperation with employers.2s  Again, work-related alliances, pressures,
and power are dispersed, yet patterned, multi-dimensional and highly
unequal. The following chart illustrates this dynamic web of relations.
Critical feminists and critical race theorists have explored the
epistemic advantage that people at the bottom of hierarchies, often people
of color and women, have in escaping dominant views and imagining
alternatives to the majority culture. 9 A complex understanding of the
287. NELSON W. POLSBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY 118 (1963).
288. We have seen how loyalty to the organization, whether to the union or to a
team/committee, often increases loyalty and motivation in regard to the workplace in
general. Empirical studies support these arguments as well. See, e.g., HECKSCHER, supra
note 78, at 6 (Motivation is proved to be higher in workplaces where there is a strong
union); Bainbridge, supra note 43, at 1026 (citing James Wallace Bishop & K. Dow Scott,
How Commitment Affects Team Performance, HR MAGAZINE, Feb. 1997, at 110) (evidence
shows that commitment and loyalty to the work team, rather than to the firm, is the factor
that brings about increased productivity); Freeman & Lazear, supra note 44, at 28 (only
"real" participation of employees through work councils with real power is likely to result in
greater loyalty of employees to their firms); Lynch, supra note 24 (stating that a recent
national survey indicates that only when participation implemented in unionized settings
productivity increases).
289. See, e.g., Alison M. Jaggar, Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist
Epistemology, in GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE: FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF BEING AND
KNOWING 145, 162 (Alison M. Jaggar & Susan R. Bordo eds., 1989); Susan H. Williams &
David C. Williams, A Feminist Theory of Malebashing, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 35, 126-
127. Empathy is developed by people at the bottom of hierarchies out of necessity, as
opposed to those in control, who employ empathy out of goodness or sense of commitment.
See Cynthia V. Ward, A Kinder, Gentler Liberalism? Vision of Empathy in Feminist and
Communitarian Literature, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 929, 950 (1994).
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logic of control and the functions of power in the workplace further
illuminates the importance of the number of hierarchies in shaping the
relative power of the powerless.
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TABLE II: Why ConstructiveT -i-? 11
Adversarial 4-*
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Thus, I believe that rather than choosing between labor law and new
forms of employee participation, a legal regime should support a
"constructive tension" and require both "adversarial" collective bargaining
schemes and "cooperative" participatory schemes, in order to create spaces
for resistance and positive shifts among systemic uses of power in the
workplace. Institutions and culture are not monolithic. They serve both as
a means of control and a site for reform and resistance. A multiplicity of
worker organizations can provide alternative routes and bypasses to "check
and balance" work power relations. The model that I propose can sustain
the need for "solidarity" and "fragmentation," the "power of numbers" and
"the power of separatism," strong "united" representation and direct
"unmediated" grassroots activism. Most importantly, a constructive
tension will enable workers to broaden their understandings of the nature
and possibilities of such organizations, to recognize the links between
different economies, industries and "types" of workers, and to imagine new
institutions that will challenge these so often false dichotomies.
VII. CONCLUSION - BETWEEN HAMMOCKS AND WEBS
Describing efforts of building work-related social institutions in
Mexico, that would be "decentralized" and "heterogeneous," Gustavo
Esteva writes:
We discovered that webs - as fisherman and spiders know very
well - are designed to trap ... So we started to use the image of a
hammock to represent, metaphorically, our vocation. Like a web,
a hammock holds the idea of horizontality and lack of a center
(except for its center of gravity). But it opens other possibilities.
The hammock is there, where it is placed: one is not inside it, nor
part of it, nor a member of it. It can be used or not used when
necessary, and for whatever purpose. One can change its
location and carry it along when travelling. The hammock, above
all, has the quality of adopting the shape of its user. "We" are not
a web nor a hammock. "We" have a hammock: a flexible
construction that "we" use when "we" need or want.
290
Every human network, even when not originally designed to do so,
has the potential to "trap"-to become coercive. This is the nature of the
collective, that in addition to its promises, there are always perils.
Changing the metaphor (from web to hammock, from worker to employee,
from union to caucus) has "real" power in the shaping of consciousness.
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Yet, increasing our awareness to the many ways in which power continues
to "trap" in newly named frameworks is essential.
In this paper, I have suggested that a multi-dimensional understanding
of power can help us contemplate the pervasive dilemma of how to
reallocate power, without, once again, creating structures of coercion and
exclusion. I have argued that in work-related institutions, both legal and
cultural understandings of power traditionally emphasize paradigmatic
hierarchical forces and overlook other dimensions. I further argued that
rather than eliminating coercive mechanisms, shifting work patterns have
changed the visibility and nature of coercion. Indeed, rather than
attempting the impossible goal of "eliminating" the risks of power, we
should aim to keep power in motion, to create spaces for resistance, to open
visions for reform and to trigger multiple responses and possibilities for
agency and empowerment, from within rather than from "without" a
framework of power.
